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ABSTRACT 
  This Article takes as its starting point the “agency reference model” 
for judicial preemption decisions, adopting the foundational premise 
that courts should take advantage of what federal agencies, which are 
uniquely positioned to evaluate the impact of state regulation and 
common law liability upon federal regulatory schemes, have to offer. 
The Article’s main focus is on the federalism dimension of the debate: 
Congress’s and federal agencies’ respective ability to serve as loci of 
meaningful debate with state governmental entities about the impact 
of federal regulatory schemes on state regulatory interests. 
Notwithstanding the dismal track record of federal agencies, which 
seems to be characterized by total neglect of states’ regulatory 
interests, the Article sides with agencies over Congress and trains its 
focus on reform of the agency rulemaking process. Given that the 
1999 Federalism Executive Order provides a blueprint for timely and 
meaningful consultation with the states, issuance of federalism impact 
statements, and robust interchanges during the notice-and-comment 
period, what is needed now is an effective enforcement mechanism. 
  The Article advocates a variety of “agency-forcing” measures 
designed to enhance the ability of Congress, the executive, and 
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especially the courts, to ensure that agencies abide by executive 
mandates and other reforms, and to provide a check on overt 
politicization or inaction on agencies’ part. The Article introduces the 
concept of “indirect challenges” to agency rulemaking, arising outside 
of the Administrative Procedure Act’s domain of direct challenges to 
agency action at a later juncture when a defendant asserts a 
preemption defense to state common law tort actions.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Federal preemption of state tort law has emerged on the modern 
political and judicial scene with a vengeance. Federal agencies have 
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promulgated myriad regulations asserting preemptive authority,1 the 
U.S. Supreme Court has decided a rash of products liability 
preemption cases,2 and Congress has gotten in on the game, holding 
hearings to consider legislation designed to undo the Court’s 
handiwork in the realm of medical devices and food products.3 
The change in administration presents a ripe opportunity to 
reevaluate the organization of the regulatory state and the 
appropriate roles of Congress and federal agencies. This Article 
concludes that the roles of Congress and federal agencies with regard 
to health and safety regulation preemption determinations are, and 
should be, precisely the opposite of what scholars and critics 
conventionally think. Congress—the institutional actor typically 
heralded as democratically accountable, and thus willing to heed 
states’ interests—proves, in actuality, to be nearly indifferent to those 
committed to state regulatory interests and, in any event, relatively 
powerless to advance them. And federal agencies—typically 
 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009) (holding that FDA approval of 
warnings on a pharmaceutical company’s label did not provide a complete defense to state tort 
claims); Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 551 (2008) (holding that a state fraud claim 
against a cigarette manufacturer was not preempted by federal law); Warner-Lambert Co. v. 
Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008), aff’g by an equally divided Court Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & 
Co., 467 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that federal law did not preempt a state tort law 
providing a “fraud-on-the-FDA” exception to state immunity for drug manufacturers whose 
drugs are approved by the FDA); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1011 (2008) (holding 
that a federal statute regulating medical devices preempts state tort law when the device at issue 
had received FDA premarket approval). 
 3. See Food and Drug Administration Globalization Act of 2009, H.R. 759, 111th Cong. 
§ 2 (2009) (providing “savings” language to the FDCA to the effect that neither the Act nor any 
amendments thereto “may . . . be construed as modifying or otherwise affecting any action or 
the liability of any person . . . under the law of any State”); see also Medical Device Safety Act 
of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (introduced Mar. 5, 2009 and referred to the Subcommittee on 
Health Mar. 6, 2009); Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2008) (providing 
a savings clause and effectively overturning Riegel); Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, H.R. 
6381, 110th Cong. (2008) (same); Barry Meier, Life, Death and Liability: An Effort to Restore 
the Right to Sue Device Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2009, at B1 (“Two House Democrats, 
Henry A. Waxman of California, the chairman of the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee, and Frank Pallone Jr. of New Jersey, the head of its health subcommittee, plan to 
reintroduce soon legislation that would effectively nullify the Supreme Court decision. A similar 
Senate bill, sponsored last year by Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, and 
Patrick J. Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, is expected to be reintroduced in coming months.”); 
Letter from H. Thomas Wells, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass’n, to Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr., 
Chairman, Subcomm. on Health, Comm. on Energy & Commerce, U.S. House of 
Representatives (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/tortlaw/2008 
dec29_medicaldeviceh_l.pdf (urging the sponsor of H.R. 6381 to reintroduce it in the next 
Congress). 
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understood as insulated, undemocratic institutions, that are, 
moreover, tools of the reigning political party—surprisingly emerge 
as the best possible protectors of state regulatory interests. 
What emerges from this reassessment of institutional roles? 
Given that federal agencies have become the real decisionmakers in 
preemption controversies, state governmental entities cannot assume 
that Congress will be a receptive or effective audience. It is indeed 
understandable that state entities have looked to Congress for 
sympathy, particularly during the George W. Bush (Bush II) 
administration, when federal agencies acted in blatant disregard of 
state regulatory interests. The Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) machinations surrounding the issuance of a preemption 
preamble to a 2006 prescription drug labeling rule exemplifies a wider 
pattern of neglect of states’ regulatory interests.4 But now that 
Congress has taken a back seat to federal agencies on critical 
questions of preemption, it is not useful to yearn for a (perhaps 
fictional) time when Congress reigned supreme. Instead, a wise 
strategy would be to embrace the primacy of federal agencies and to 
focus on reforming them to ensure they can become a rich forum for 
participation by state governmental entities. 
Part I explores the federal agencies’ dismal track record on 
accountability and highlights why reform is necessary. A close look at 
the circumstances behind the FDA’s issuance of the 2006 drug 
labeling preemption preamble reveals a lack of transparency, 
procedural irregularity, and utter indifference toward state 
governmental entities. This, moreover, is but one example of federal 
agencies’ documented disregard of congressional and executive 
mandates to incorporate into their rulemaking process consultation 
with relevant state entities and investigation of the potential 
consequences of their rules on state regulatory schemes. The FDA’s 
2008 drug labeling regulation addresses circumstances in which drug 
manufacturers can unilaterally (that is, prior to FDA approval) 
change drug labels in light of newly acquired information.5 The 
regulation signaled a measured step in the right direction, but it 
provides meager confidence that reform is headed inevitably in that 
direction. 
 
 4. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 5. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 314, 601, 814). 
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Against this rather bleak background, Part II presents a 
comparative institutional analysis of Congress and federal agencies 
with respect to preemption determinations. As I have argued 
previously, in making preemption decisions, courts should take 
advantage of what federal agencies, which are uniquely positioned to 
evaluate the impact of state regulation and common law liability upon 
federal regulatory schemes, have to offer.6 The “agency reference 
model”7 that I have proposed would be “information-forcing” in the 
sense that it would require product manufacturers to come forward to 
the FDA with new safety risk information, including clinical studies, 
adverse event reports and the like, as a precondition for court 
determinations of preemption.8 In this Article, I address a new 
dimension of the debate: Congress’s and federal agencies’ respective 
ability to serve as loci of meaningful debate with state governmental 
entities about the impact of federal regulatory schemes on state 
regulatory interests. 
Part III launches an imaginative rethinking of the institutional 
role played by federal agencies. A brighter future, giving voice to 
state regulatory interests in preemption decisionmaking can only 
happen in the wake of fundamental reforms to the agency rulemaking 
process, as well as to the general approach that agencies take toward 
those who represent state regulatory interests. A threshold question is 
precisely who represents these state interests, a vexing issue in the 
sphere of consumer health and safety, where typically preemption 
involves the displacement of state common law and there is no state-
level agency or regulatory apparatus to serve as a natural 
representative. State governmental entities emerge as likely (albeit 
imperfect) contenders. 
The 1999 Federalism Executive Order (No. 13,132) provides a 
blueprint for reform: timely and meaningful consultation with the 
states throughout the process, issuance of federalism impact 
statements that detail the effects upon the states and changes in the 
federal-state balance, robust interchanges during the notice-and-
comment period, including solicitation of comments and responses 
thereto. The spirit of the executive order is even more far-sighted, 
 
 6. E.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 452–53 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability 
Preemption]. 
 7. Id. at 477–502. 
 8. See id. at 520. 
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envisioning a cooperative partnership between states and agencies in 
the development of rules and regulations. Critical to the success of 
any such reforms, however, is an effective enforcement mechanism—
a serious drawback of the existing executive order. 
Part IV takes up a variety of “agency-forcing” measures designed 
to enhance the ability of Congress, the executive, and especially the 
courts, to ensure that agencies abide by executive mandates and other 
reforms, and to provide a check on overt politicization or inaction on 
agencies’ part. Previous attempts to urge Congress to codify the 
federalism executive order have not been successful, nor have 
scholarly calls for the executive to seize the reins to harmonize 
enforcement via centralized review by its Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs been heeded. This Article revisits the 
enforcement potential of each of these institutional actors before 
turning to innovative proposals centering upon courts. The absence of 
direct challenges to preemptive health and safety regulations has 
contributed to a failure of the imagination on the part of scholars to 
harness administrative law process in service of reform. This Article 
introduces the concept of indirect challenges to agency rulemaking, 
arising outside of the Administrative Procedure Act’s domain of 
direct challenges to agency action at a later juncture when a 
defendant asserts a preemption defense to state common law tort 
actions. Courts have an opportunity to scrutinize both the empirical 
substrate of the regulatory record compiled by the agency as well as 
its articulated reasons underlying any interpretive policy. 
Anticipation of such judicial review at this stage would force agencies 
(prodded by interested parties, such as drug manufacturers) not only 
to adhere to the strictures of the executive order, but also to compile 
a diligent agency record that would serve as the basis of the court’s 
evaluation of whether the state tort action seeks to “redo” the 
analysis conducted by the agency and should therefore be ousted. 
Finally, agencies would be dissuaded from operating on the basis of 
politically motivated “proclamations of pre-emption”9 that would not 
withstand judicial scrutiny and would instead be goaded toward 
 
 9. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009). Wyeth stands as a prominent example of 
an indirect challenge to an agency regulation—in this case, the FDA’s preemption preamble—
with dire consequences for the defendant manufacturer. For discussion, see infra notes 247–52 
and accompanying text. 
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notice-and-comment rulemaking, which “offer[] States or other 
interested parties notice or opportunity for comment.”10 
I.  AGENCY DISREGARD OF STATE REGULATORY INTERESTS 
In a 2007 article, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and 
the Federalization of Tort Law, I began with a tale of three agencies—
the FDA, the National Highway Transportation and Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), and the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission (CPSC)—each of which had promulgated a preamble to 
a proposed rule, stating that the rule would displace competing state 
tort claims.11 The nascent trend I identified—of federal agencies 
issuing express directives that oust state tort law claims—has picked 
up steam in the ensuing years. Agencies—particularly the FDA and 
NHTSA—are disregarding and even defying state regulatory 
interests, stooping so low as to engage in bait-and-switch tactics: 
publicly disclaiming preemptive effect during the notice-and-
comment rulemaking period, and then, without warning, eviscerating 
that disclaimer with a resolute preemption provision in the final rule. 
Against this backdrop of stealth maneuvers and deceptive 
communications with state governmental entities, an agenda of 
reinvigorated agency accountability might seem dubious, if not 
outright naïve. A small glimmer of hope is provided by the 2008 FDA 
drug labeling regulation, which was ushered through the notice-and-
comment process with a modicum of procedural regularity. Yet this 
example bears many of the same distressing signs: distrust between 
federal agencies and state governmental agencies, dysfunction in the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process, and missed opportunities 
for agency reform. This is the sobering backdrop for the reform 
measures I propose in Parts III and IV. 
A. The FDA’s Dismal Record 
1. FDA 2006 Drug Labeling Rule.  Agency skeptics’ worst fears 
were realized in the FDA’s handling of the rulemaking process 
leading up to its 2006 rule on the format and content of prescription 
drug labels. To begin, in its notice of proposed rulemaking in 
 
 10. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201. 
 11. Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the 
Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227, 228 (2007) [hereinafter Sharkey, 
Preemption by Preamble]. 
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December 2000, the FDA disclaimed any potential preemptive effect, 
stating clearly that “this proposed rule does not contain policies that 
have federalism implications or that preempt State law.”12 With this 
denial, the FDA relieved itself from the further requirements of the 
executive mandate on federalism (Executive Order 13,132), which 
requires consultation with relevant state organizations.13 Any 
interested parties that followed FDA involvement in pharmaceutical 
regulation—particularly those monitoring agency rules with the 
potential to oust existing state law regulations and common law tort 
liability—would, moreover, take this as a signal to focus 
antipreemption efforts elsewhere. 
It therefore came as a surprise—unwelcome, to say the least—
that the final rule issued by the FDA in January 2006 contained an 
express statement of preemptive intent.14 The FDA’s preemption 
statement, moreover, materialized in the rule’s preamble, thus 
eluding detection via the transparent and public process of notice-
and-comment rulemaking.15 
In an act of breathtaking hubris, the FDA included a federalism 
impact statement (as required by Executive Order 13,132) that 
defended its actions16 and subtly held state governmental groups to 
blame: 
FDA sought input from all stakeholders on new requirements for 
the content and format of prescription drug labeling through 
publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register. Although 
the proposed rule did not propose to preempt state law, it did solicit 
 
 12. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and 
Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082, 81,103 
(proposed Dec. 22, 2000). 
 13. For a full discussion of Executive Order 13,132, see infra notes 122–27 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 
601) (“FDA believes that under existing preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under 
the act, whether it be in the old or new format, preempts conflicting or contrary State law.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. The main thrust of the FDA’s federalism impact statement (FIS) was that the FDA had 
authority to preempt state law in this area. Id. at 3967–69. According to the FDA, “[i]f State 
authorities, including judges and juries applying State law, were permitted to reach conclusions 
about the safety and effectiveness [of labels] . . . the federal system for regulation of drugs would 
be disrupted.” Id. at 3969. The FDA acknowledged its obligation under Executive Order 13,132 
to preempt state law as minimally as possible, but claimed that “[t]his final rule meets the 
preceding requirement because . . . it preempts state law only to the extent required to preserve 
Federal interests.” Id. 
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comment on product liability issues. FDA received no comments on 
the proposed rule from State and local governmental entities.17 
Perhaps in an effort to camouflage its duplicitous, 180-degree 
change in its position on the rule’s preemptive effect, which it 
deliberately set out in a preamble and without public comment, the 
FDA dared to suggest that it consulted with state governmental 
officials and entities: 
Officials at FDA consulted with a number of organizations 
representing the interests of state and local governments and 
officials about the interaction between FDA regulation of 
prescription drug labeling (including this rule) and state law.18 
At best, the FDA was referring to its solicitation of comments 
during the notice-and-comment period—although it was during that 
period that the FDA disclaimed any preemptive effect. At worst, the 
FDA was being disingenuous. 
State representatives take the latter view. Susan Frederick, 
Federal Affairs Counsel for the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (NCSL), recounts a telephone call she received late in 
the day on December 30, 2005, from an FDA intergovernmental staff 
member, who informed her that the FDA planned to issue its “long-
dormant labeling rule” in early January 2006 and that it would 
include a statement preempting state laws.19 The FDA’s general 
counsel’s office then informed Ms. Frederick that “NCSL could not 
review this proposed language in advance of its publication, that this 
telephone call constituted the consultation under Executive Order 
13,132, and that the comment period was closed and would not be 
reopened to permit NCSL to submit comments on the new 
language.”20 Donna Stone, president of the NCSL and Delaware State 
Representative, likewise tried to set the record straight in her 
September 2007 testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee: 
NCSL approached FDA officials and asked for three things: a 
consultation meeting pursuant to the Federalism Executive Order, a 
copy of the proposed language, and that the FDA re-open the 
comment period to allow NCSL to file formal comments on this very 
 
 17. Id. at 3969. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Brief of the National Conference of State Legislatures as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 9–10, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851606. 
 20. Id. at 10 (quoting the Affidavit of Susan Parnas Frederick). 
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significant and preemptive change. The FDA ignored the first 
request. The second and third requests were denied.21 
In a letter to the secretary of Health and Human Services, NCSL 
expressed its outrage at the lack of transparency of the FDA’s process 
and, even more so, at its stifling of participation by the states’ 
representatives: “It is unacceptable that FDA would not permit the 
states to be heard on language that has a direct impact on state civil 
justice systems nationwide.”22 Several members of Congress echoed 
this sense of outrage given that “neither [the] affected state and local 
entities . . . nor the general public were given an opportunity to 
comment.”23 
2. FDA 2008 Drug Labeling Rule.  The FDA’s 2008 notice-and-
comment rulemaking procedure to amend its drug labeling 
regulations stands in fairly sharp contrast to the procedurally flawed 
process of its 2006 promulgation of the drug labeling preemption 
preamble.24 The regulation, which amends the “changes being 
 
 21. Regulatory Preemption: Are Federal Agencies Usurping Congressional and State 
Authority?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 144 (2007) [hereinafter 
Sen. Hearing on Regulatory Preemption] (statement of Donna D. Stone, President, National 
Conference of State Legislatures), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony. 
cfm?id=2935&wit_id=6641. Stone further charged that “during this rule’s 5-year dormancy 
period, the FDA had allowed certain large pharmaceutical companies to submit comments 
pertaining to preemption after the expiration of the comment period.” Id. at 144–45. 
 22. Letter from Ill. State Senator Steven J. Rauschenberger, President, Nat’l Conference of 
State Legislatures, to Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs. (Jan. 13, 
2006) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/press/2006/060113Leavitt. 
htm. The letter also sharply criticized the FDA’s justification of its action: 
NCSL understands that FDA now intends to finalize this rule and include a policy 
statement that provisions of the Labeling Rule would now preempt state product 
liability laws. NCSL recently asked FDA officials why it was including this harmful 
language. References to several recent court cases wherein FDA filed amicus briefs 
and in which FDA’s position on federal preemption of state laws did not prevail were 
offered. FDA further informed NCSL it would not re-publish the Labeling Rule and 
open it up for comments based on this very significant change, nor would it share the 
proposed language with NCSL. 
Id. 
 23. Letter from Representative Henry A. Waxman et al., to Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. 
Dep’t Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 23, 2006), available at http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q= 
node/3381; see also Letter from Edward M. Kennedy & Christopher J. Dodd, Senators, U.S. 
Senate, to Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs. (Feb. 23, 2006), 
available at http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/3381 (“We strongly believe that states 
have an important role to play in protecting consumers and patients from unsafe drugs, and 
question the notion that the FDA alone can provide this protection.”). 
 24. The proposed regulation was published in the Federal Register on January 16, 2008, the 
FDA solicited comments, and the final rule was published on August 22, 2008 (effective 
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effected” (CBE) supplements rule, governs the circumstances under 
which a pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer may alter a 
warning when new risks come to light, without the FDA having to 
preapprove the revision.25 The regulation clarifies that the CBE rule 
applies only to situations where “newly acquired information” has 
come to light; moreover, it requires the existence of “sufficient 
evidence of a causal association” between the risk and an adverse 
outcome before the manufacturer can unilaterally revise the 
warning.26 
The FDA considers its latest CBE regulation to be consistent 
with the 2006 drug labeling preemption preamble. In both, the FDA 
“interprets the [Food Drug and Cosmetics] Act to establish both a 
‘floor’ and a ‘ceiling,’ such that additional disclosures of risk 
information can expose a manufacturer to liability under the act if the 
additional statement is unsubstantiated or otherwise false or 
misleading.”27 Since the inauguration of the drug labeling preemption 
preamble, the FDA has pushed its view that public health and safety 
are threatened by the prospect of overwarning: “This amendment is 
intended to clarify FDA’s existing policies and is intended to ensure 
that scientifically valid and appropriately worded warnings will be 
provided in the approved labeling for medical products, and to 
prevent overwarning, which may deter appropriate use of medical 
products, or overshadow more important warnings.”28 
Numerous parties—including consumer advocacy groups, 
individuals, law firms, law professors, pharmaceutical companies, 
trade associations, and members of Congress—commented upon the 
 
September 22, 2008). Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved 
Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, 814). 
 25. Id. at 49,603–04. 
 26. Id. at 49,604. “Newly acquired information” is defined in the final rule as “data, 
analyses, or other information not previously submitted to the agency, which may include (but 
are not limited to) data derived from new clinical studies, reports of adverse events, or new 
analyses of previously submitted data (e.g., meta-analyses) if the studies, events or analyses 
reveal risks of a different type or greater severity or frequency than previously included in 
submissions to FDA.” Id. at 49,609. 
 27. Id. at 49,605 (quoting Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human 
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be 
codified at 21 CFR pts. 201, 314, 601) (drug labeling preemption preamble)). 
 28. Id. at 49,605–06; see also Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human 
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935 (“State-law attempts to impose 
additional warnings can lead to labeling that does not accurately portray a product’s risks, 
thereby potentially discouraging safe and effective use of approved products . . . .”). 
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proposed regulation during the notice-and-comment period.29 Several 
objectors, including a panel of Congress members, filed scathing 
remarks that accused the FDA of politically motivated and 
disingenuous action.30 Others questioned why “an agency that is 
clearly in crisis would seek to limit consumers’ access to information 
about crucial health and safety risks.”31 More specifically, several 
House Representatives charged that the FDA “suffers from a high 
turnover rate of scientists, an inadequate information technology 
system, a weak organizational structure, and a rapidly declining 
inspection force.”32 
Most relevant for present purposes, states were given an explicit 
opportunity to comment on the rule’s impact “(1) [o]n the States, (2) 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, 
or (3) on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
 
 29. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. at 49,604–05 (“FDA received approximately 20 
comments to the January 2008 proposed rule.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & 
Gov’t Reform, to Andrew C. von Eschenbach, Comm’r, FDA 1 (Jan. 23, 2008) [hereinafter 
Waxman Letter], available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId= 
0900006480401a97&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (claiming the CBE rule was not 
“an isolated case, but part of a pattern of actions in the Bush Administration’s final months to 
permanently insulate the drug and device industry from liability”). The letter was cosigned by a 
number of other congressmen, including Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. Id. at 6; see also Letter from Ronald 
Goldman, Esquire, Baum, Hedlund, Aristei & Goldman, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA 6 
(Mar. 17, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId= 
09000064803ff31e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf (“[S]ince the arrival of the Bush 
administration, FDA policy-makers seem to have forgotten the FDA’s objectives and 
obligations. Rather, the agency appears to be more concerned with protecting the profits of the 
pharmaceutical industry.”); Letter from Peter Lurie, Deputy Dir., & Sydney M. Wolfe, Dir. of 
Health Research, Public Citizen, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA 3 (Mar. 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocketDetail&d=FDA-2008-N-
0032 (noting that the FDA’s propreemption policy stance emerged only in the last few years). 
 31. Letter from Bart Stupak et al., U.S. House of Reps., to Andrew C. von Eschenbach, 
Comm’r, FDA 1 (Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter House of Representatives Letter], available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=0900006480401990&dispositio
n=attachment&contentType=pdf; see also Letter from Kathleen Flynn Peterson, President, Am. 
Ass’n for Justice, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA 3 (Mar. 17, 2008), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064803fab4b&dispositio
n=attachment&contentType=pdf (claiming that the FDA’s proposal would limit dissemination 
of risk information “at a time when every independent evaluation has shown that the FDA is 
woefully incapable of acting timely to provide this information”); Waxman Letter, supra note 
30, at 1 (questioning whether an agency would spend its already-strapped resources to 
promulgate a rule “that will serve only to deprive American consumers of critically important 
and timely information”). 
 32. House of Representatives Letter, supra note 31, at 1–2. 
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various levels of government.”33 In response to this outreach to states, 
the FDA received only a single comment from the Conference of 
Chief Justices (CCJ).34 The CCJ is a group composed of the highest 
judicial officers in each of the fifty states. It has “traditionally adopted 
formal positions to defend against proposed policies that threaten 
principles of federalism or that seek to preempt state court 
authority.”35 The CCJ charged that the proposed rule lacked 
“sufficient statement of actual, irreconcilable conflict to justify the 
FDA’s broad assertion of implied preemption of all state law”36 based 
upon “an unwarranted and abstract assumption that state statutes and 
traditional tort litigation invariably cause conflict with federal 
regulatory policy.”37 
The evolution of the CBE regulation presents a paradigmatic 
example of mutual breakdown or dysfunction in the notice-and-
comment process.38 On the one hand, state governmental bodies (such 
as the NCSL) failed to take advantage of the opportunity to 
comment; by absenting themselves, they ensured that they would not 
play a role in shaping the ultimate regulation. On the other hand, the 
FDA’s cursory rejection of the bulk of the comments and suggestions 
it actually received during the notice-and-comment period suggests 
that such participation by states would have been futile at best—thus 
reinforcing those groups’ views that their energies are best directed 
elsewhere. 
 
 33. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,609 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, 814) (“FDA issued a ‘Dear Colleague’ letter . . . . [t]he purpose of [which] 
was to alert officials in various organizations within the fifty States about the rulemaking, 
including officials with State pharmacy boards, State medical boards, health commissioners, and 
drug program directors.”). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Letter from Jean Hoeffer Toal, President, Conf. of Chief Justices, to Div. of Docket 
Mgmt., FDA 1 (Mar. 17, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/Content 
Viewer?objectId=09000064803ff415&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. 
 36. Id. at 2. 
 37. Id. at 3. 
 38. Here, I put to one side the fact that the FDA’s decision to amend the CBE regulation 
seemed motivated by a desire to affect pending litigation in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 
(2009). The FDA cited the U.S. government’s amicus brief in Wyeth twice in promulgating its 
final rule. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. at 49,605–06. In Wyeth, the Solicitor General 
argued for a rule preempting any state law claims that “challenge labeling that FDA approved 
after being informed of the relevant risk.” Id. at 49,606 (quoting Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-
1249), 2008 WL 2308908). 
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The FDA’s machinations in 2006 do not appear to be an isolated 
event. Although one of the more egregious examples, the 
promulgation of the drug label preemption preamble fits a wider 
empirical pattern of federal agencies’ shunting of state regulatory 
interests. 
B. Empirical Evidence of Widespread Agency Pattern and Practice 
The FDA case study in drug labeling is but an extreme example 
of a sufficiently entrenched pattern of disregard for state interests. 
The pattern of agency defiance of, or superficial compliance with, 
congressional and executive mandates to consider states’ interests has 
been the subject of limited empirical study. For example, Nina 
Mendelson has collected evidence of agencies’ flouting their 
responsibility to conduct federalism impact statements (FISs).39 As 
Mendelson detailed in 2004, FISs are few and far between in the 
annals of the Federal Register. From 1996–1998, only five of the more 
than 11,000 final rules issued contained an FIS.40 Mendelson 
estimated that for proposed rules during one quarter in 1998, FISs are 
included in only 9 of 2546 agency rulemakings.41 For 2003, the rate of 
agency issuance of FISs seemed to pick up slightly. Mendelson turned 
up six FISs in one quarter of 2003, a time period in which six hundred 
final rules were issued.42 
Besides being relatively rare, FISs also tend to be, in 
Mendelson’s words, of “poor quality.”43 The prototypical FIS, should 
it train its focus on preemption at all, simply attempts to justify the 
agency’s authority to preempt state law on the basis of delegated 
(usually implied) statutory authority, without expounding broader 
federalism values.44 Most of the FISs in 2003 simply affirmed the 
agency’s authority to preempt without any acknowledgement of the 
 
 39. Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 783–84 (2004). 
 40. Id. at 783–84. Mendelson’s figure is taken from H.R. 2245, The Federalism Act of 1999: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat’l Econ. Growth, Natural Res., and Regulatory Affairs of 
the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 101 (1999) (statement of Nye Stevens, Director, 
Federal Management and Workforce Issues, General Government Division, General 
Accounting Office). 
 41. Mendelson, supra note 39, at 784 n.192. 
 42. Id. at 783. Mendelson performed the following search: “Executive Order 13132” and 
not (%) ((no or not) /s federalism). Id. at 783 n.191. She then examined the remaining rules 
individually and found five that included an FIS of some sort and one which claimed an FIS 
would be available if requested. Id. 
 43. Id. at 783. 
 44. Id. at 784. 
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values endorsed by the executive order mandating them.45 According 
to Mendelson, examples of irresponsible agency action dominate the 
few instances in which FISs are provided.46 Take, for instance, the FIS 
proffered in conjunction with the Department of Homeland 
Security’s issuance of chemical security rules. Evidently, the agency 
believed that an obligatory citation to the Supremacy Clause setting 
forth its authority to preempt sufficed in terms of discussion of 
relevant state interests.47 
My own study of the track records of the FDA and NHTSA over 
the last several years reaffirms this general pattern.48 The story is one 
of outright contradictions—agencies initially claimed that the 
proposed rule would not have a substantial effect on the federal-state 
balance, only to assert the preemptive effect upon promulgation of 
the final rule—coupled with cavalier denials of any impact on 
federalism, even where the preemptive intent of the agency’s rule was 
apparent. 
1. Bait-and-Switch.  With the benefit of hindsight, the FDA’s 
2006 preemption preamble to the drug labeling rule can be seen as 
but one example of agency bait-and-switch tactics. Just one year after 
the FDA rolled out an interim final rule on soluble fibers, which 
stated in no uncertain terms that the rule had no substantial effect on 
the states and did not “contain policies that have federalism 
implications, as defined in [Executive Order 13,132],”49 the FDA 
“determined that the [final] rule will have a preemptive effect on 
State law,” inserting boilerplate preemptive language prohibiting 
states from “issuing any health claim labeling requirements for 
 
 45. Id. (“Only one of the five [FISs] . . . even acknowledged the interests of states in 
protecting their in-state residents . . . .”). 
 46. In a further study, Mendelson turned up six rules or proposed rules with preemptive 
effects in 2006. Of these, only three concluded that FISs were required, and only a single FIS 
was substantive. Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 695, 719 (2008). 
 47. Id. at 720–21. 
 48. I am grateful to journalist Pete Yost of the Associated Press for providing me with a list 
of proposed and final rules containing preemption provisions—issued by the FDA, NHTSA, 
CPSC, Federal Railroad Administration, and Department of Homeland Security—which was a 
useful starting point for my research. See E-mail from Pete Yost to Catherine Sharkey, 
Professor of Law, New York Univ. Sch. of Law (May 5, 2008, 12:31 EST) (on file with Duke 
Law Journal). 
 49. Food Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Dietary Fiber from Certain Foods and 
Coronary Heart Disease, 70 Fed. Reg. 76,150, 76,161 (interim final rule Dec. 23, 2005). 
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barley . . . that are not identical to those required by this final rule.”50 
The FDA has followed this pattern again and again in both the drug 
and food contexts. For example, with rulemakings involving laxative 
drug products, adverse event reporting on drugs, and dandruff 
shampoos, the FDA has disclaimed any preemption or federalism 
implications in the proposed or interim rule, only to follow up in short 
order with a final rule that clearly spells out the preemptive effect and 
seeks to justify it on legal grounds.51 In other instances, arising in the 
context of rulemakings for foods and over-the-counter drugs, the 
FDA tentatively concluded that the proposed rule would have no 
effect on states (thus, according to the agency, negating the need for 
consultation with the states), only to follow up with a definitive 
assertion of preemptive effect in the final rule.52 
 
 50. Food Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Dietary Fiber from Certain Foods and 
Coronary Heart Disease, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,248, 29,250 (May 22, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
101). 
 51. Compare Laxative Drug Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Proposed 
Amendment to the Tentative Final Monograph, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,133, 46,137 (proposed Aug. 5, 
2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 310, 334) (stating that the proposal did not contain 
policies that would affect the federal-state balance), with Laxative Drug Products for Over-the-
Counter Human Use; Psyllium Ingredients in Granular Dosage Forms, 72 Fed. Reg. 14,669, 
14,673 (Mar. 29, 2007) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 310) (asserting that the agency’s policy 
decision carried preemptive effect); compare Toll-Free Number for Reporting Adverse Events 
on Labeling for Human Drug Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 21,778, 21,792 (proposed Apr. 22, 2004) (to 
be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 208, 209) (stating that the rule would not alter the federal-state 
balance), with Toll-Free Number for Reporting Adverse Events on Labeling for Human Drug 
Products, 73 Fed. Reg. 63,886, 63,896 (Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 208, 
209) (stating that the rule preempts state law); compare Dandruff, Seborrheic Dermatitis, and 
Psoriasis Drug Products Containing Coal Tar and Menthol for Over-the-Counter Human Use; 
Proposed Amendment to the Monograph, 70 Fed. Reg. 73,178, 73,180 (proposed Dec. 9, 2005) 
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 310, 358) (stating that the proposal did not have federalism 
implications), with Dandruff, Seborrheic Dermatitis, and Psoriasis Drug Products Containing 
Coal Tar and Menthol for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Amendment to the Monograph, 72 
Fed. Reg. 9849, 9851 (Mar. 6, 2007) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 310, 358) (stating that the rule 
would preempt state law). 
 52. Compare Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, Expansion of the Nutrient Content 
Claim “Lean,” 70 Fed. Reg. 71,041, 71,056 (proposed Nov. 25, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 101) (stating that the rule “does not contain policies that have substantial direct effects on 
the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power” and “tentatively conclud[ing] that the rule [did] not contain policies that 
have federalism implications,” thus negating the need for a federalism impact statement), with 
Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, Expansion of the Nutrient Content Claim “Lean,” 72 
Fed. Reg. 1455, 1459 (Jan. 12, 2007) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (prohibiting states from 
“promulgating any nutrient content claim labeling requirements for the claim ‘lean’ that are not 
identical” to those in the final rule); compare Over-the-Counter Vaginal Contraceptive Drug 
Products Containing Nonoxynol 9; Required Labeling, 68 Fed. Reg. 2254, 2261 (proposed Jan. 
16., 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) (stating that the FDA “tentatively concludes that 
SHARKEY IN FINAL 6/24/2009  8:54:12 AM 
2009] FEDERALISM ACCOUNTABILITY 2141 
The FDA is not the only culprit. In 2007, NHTSA reversed its 
position on preemption when it issued a final rule responding to a 
petition for reconsideration of its head restraint requirements.53 The 
earlier 2004 final rule stated in no uncertain terms: “The final rule is 
not intended to preempt State tort civil actions.”54 Without any 
consultation with the states, NHTSA suddenly reversed course, 
asserting that the 2007 rule preempted state law.55 
NHTSA’s defense of its decision to bypass state consultation 
rings hollow. First, NHTSA quixotically proclaimed that, despite 
preempting state law, its rule had no “substantial direct effects on the 
States” or the relationship between the federal and state 
governments.56 NHTSA further reasoned that “consultation [with 
States, local governments or other representatives] would be 
inappropriate” because the Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an 
express preemption provision, and that provision, as opposed to the 
agency’s rulemaking, was the real source of preemption.57 This flatly 
contradicted the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination that the Motor 
Vehicle Safety Act and an accompanying regulation did not expressly 
preempt state common law liability. In Geier v. American Honda 
 
the proposed rule does not contain policies that have federalism implications as defined in the 
Executive order [13,132]”), with Over-the-Counter Vaginal Contraceptive and Spermicide Drug 
Products Containing Nonoxynol 9; Required Labeling, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,769, 71,783–84 (Dec. 19, 
2007) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201) (asserting preemptive effect using boilerplate language); 
compare Cold, Cough, Allergy, Bronchodilator, and Antiasthmatic Drug Products for Over-the-
Counter Human Use; Proposed Amendment of Monograph for Over-the-Counter Nasal 
Decongestant Drug Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,482, 63,486 (proposed Nov. 2, 2004) (noting that 
the FDA “tentatively conclude[d] that the proposed rule [did] not contain policies that have 
federalism implications”), with Cold, Cough, Allergy, Bronchodilator and Antiasthmatic Drug 
Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Amendment of Monograph for OTC Nasal 
Decongestant Drug Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 43,358, 43,361 (Aug. 1, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pt. 341) (claiming preemption). In each of these cases, in the final rule, the FDA relies almost 
exclusively on the express preemption provisions of the FDCA pertaining to foods and over-
the-counter drugs, respectively, 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2006) and 21 U.S.C. § 379r (2006). But even 
if that authority were airtight, it would still beg the question of why the FDA’s earlier 
conclusions published in the proposed rules were only “tentative.” 
 53. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Head Restraints, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,484, 25,512 
(May 4, 2007) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571, 585). 
 54. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Head Restraints, 69 Fed. Reg. 74,848, 74,880 
(Dec. 14, 2004) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). 
 55. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Head Restraints, 72 Fed. Reg. at 25,512. 
Further, the record displays no opportunity for comment on this point, nor does it indicate that 
the agency had disclosed its preemptive intent at any time prior to the final rule. See id. (“[N]o 
consultation is needed to discuss the preemptive effect of today’s rule.”). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
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Motor Co.,58 which is the only products liability preemption decision 
involving the Motor Vehicle Safety Act, the Court found implied, but 
not express, preemption,59 recognizing that a primary obstacle to 
express preemption is the Safety Act’s express “saving clause” that 
purports to “save” existing common law actions.60 
NHTSA thus presents a strained reading of Geier to support its 
aggressive campaign to assert express preemption in its promulgated 
rules. More disingenuously, NHTSA inserts what has become its 
boilerplate preemption language into final rules, while denying any 
federalism impact in the notices of proposed rulemaking.61 
2. Denying “Federalism Impact” of Preemption.  It is difficult to 
imagine a more serious threat to the state-federal regulatory balance 
than the outright denial of any federalism impact of a federal rule that 
ousts competing state tort law. Notwithstanding the contradiction, 
NHTSA has forged ahead down this path of obfuscation. 
In a 2007 final rule governing labeling requirements for cargo-
carrying capacity on motor homes and vehicle trailers, NHTSA 
clearly asserts that the rule preempts state law—both 
 
 58. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
 59. Id. at 867–69. Nor does NHTSA’s add-on to the effect that “the Supreme Court has 
also recognized that State requirements . . . can stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of a NHTSA safety standard” rehabilitate NHTSA’s stance. Federal Motor Vehicle 
Safety Standards; Head Restraints, 72 Fed. Reg. at 25,512 (citing Geier, 529 U.S. 861). 
 60. Geier, 529 U.S. at 867–68. 
 61. See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection in 
Interior Impact, 72 Fed. Reg. 50,900, 50,905 (Sept. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) 
(“NHTSA has examined today’s final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 . . . and 
concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments or their 
representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the 
rulemaking would not have federalism implications because a final rule, if issued, would not 
have ‘substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national 
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government.’ Further, no consultation is needed to discuss the preemptive 
effect of today’s rulemaking.” (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255 
(Aug. 4, 1999))). In the notice of proposed rulemaking, NHTSA stated that the rule “would not 
have any substantial impact on the States, or on the current Federal-State relationship,” and 
that consultation with the states was not required. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; 
Occupant Protection in Interior Impact, 71 Fed. Reg. 20,932, 20,939–40 (proposed Apr. 24, 
2006) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). In the final rule, NHTSA also expressly reserved for 
itself the opportunity to comment on specific instances of preemption down the road. Federal 
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection in Interior Impact, 72 Fed. Reg. at 
50,905. 
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regulatory/statutory and common law.62 At the same time, it curiously 
denies that the rule has any direct impact upon the states or the 
balance of power between the federal and state governments.63 Its 
bizarre rationale is that the rule operates entirely outside the confines 
of Executive Order 13,132, because it “would apply to motor home 
manufacturers and to travel trailer manufacturers, not to the States or 
local governments.”64 Although it is true that the regulation is being 
imposed upon manufacturers, not the states, that is the case with 
respect to most (if not all) agency-directed regulations. Given the 
clear assertion of preemption in the final rule, it appears that NHTSA 
engaged in some fancy (and unconvincing) interpretive footwork with 
an eye toward bypassing Executive Order 13,132. 
II. POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM 
The agencies’ aggressive assertion of preemption, combined with 
the apparent stonewalling of, and refusal to engage with, state 
governmental bodies, has been an easy target for renewed arguments 
against the shift of decisionmaking power from Congress to federal 
agencies. Scholars who argue against the preemption of state tort law 
also invariably urge that “[c]ourts should be particularly wary of 
deferring to an agency’s determination of the preemptive effects of its 
regulations or governing statutes. Federal agencies do not represent 
the states, and their interests do not always align.”65 The states are 
especially dubious of statutory delegation of authority (express or 
implied) to agencies: “States cannot protect their interests through 
the political process if Congress has not signaled that it intends to 
trench on the states’ domain.”66 Herbert Wechsler’s “political 
safeguards of federalism”67 refrain reverberates: “The political 
branches are . . . in the best position to give due weight to the 
 
 62. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Cargo Carrying Capacity, 72 Fed. Reg. 
68,442, 68,458 (Dec. 4, 2007) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Cargo Carrying Capacity, 70 Fed. Reg. 
51,707, 51,713–14 (proposed Aug. 31, 2005) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). 
 65. Brief of Amicus Curiae Constitutional and Administrative Law Scholars in Support of 
Respondent at 32, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851604. 
 66. Brief of Amici Curiae Vermont et al. in Support of Respondent at 25, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 
1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851613 [hereinafter States’ Wyeth Amicus Brief]. 
 67. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
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fundamental federalism concerns that would be raised by any effort 
to preempt such basic and well-established state-law tort principles.”68 
A. Congress: States’ Battleground 
In 1954, Herbert Wechsler famously heralded Congress as 
accountable to states’ interests, and thus the keystone to “the political 
safeguards of federalism.”69 Central to this model is the fact that states 
have a voice in Congress, in which “[l]egislation rests in practice on a 
balancing of interests.”70 In the House of Representatives, members 
are representatives of “the people of the states,”71 and in the Senate, 
only one half of the states are needed to constitute a majority and 
“one-third plus one” of the states banding together can defeat a 
treaty.72 The electoral and legislative processes, then, hold Congress’s 
feet to the fire where issues of state and local import are concerned. 
Wechsler’s model has captured the legal imagination. Although 
academics have criticized aspects of the model or transformed it in 
significant ways,73 the model remains at the core of the conventional 
belief of the comparative superiority of Congress in the realm of 
federalism, or accountability to state regulatory interests.74 The model 
 
 68. Brief of Torts Professors Mark P. Gergen and Michael D. Green as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 33, Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851610. 
 69. Wechsler, supra note 67. 
 70. Id. at 548. 
 71. Id. at 546 (emphasis omitted). 
 72. Id. at 547. According to Wechsler, in both houses of Congress, “the states are the 
strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion, the special centers of political 
activity, the separate geographical determinants of national as well as local politics.” Id. at 546. 
 73. Larry Kramer, for example, argues that the safeguards of federalism are secured by 
political parties, not the structure of the electoral process. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics 
Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 215 (2000). 
According to Kramer, political parties are characterized by being neither programmatic nor 
centralized. Id. at 278–79. National politicians, therefore, often rely heavily on local and state 
politicians for getting out the vote and for other electoral benefits. See id. at 279 (describing 
America’s “political culture in which members of local, state, and national networks are 
encouraged, indeed expected, to work for election of candidates at every level” that encourages 
“mutual dependency among party and elected officials at different levels”). In addition, political 
parties are the mechanism by which politicians translate their local and state experience to a 
national platform. See id. at 285 (“Fully half of the members of the House of Representatives, 
for example, began their careers as state legislators, and men and women recruited and trained 
at the state level are found throughout the federal bureaucracy.”). In other words, Kramer 
substitutes the forces of localized political parties for the disciplining force of the electoral 
process of Wechsler’s model. 
 74. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907 (2000) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“The signal virtues of this presumption [against preemption include] its placement 
of the power of pre-emption squarely in the hands of Congress, which is far more suited . . . to 
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in its “pure” form is self-executing, guided by the “invisible hand” of 
the structural features of political institutions.75 
Some scholars have adeptly unmasked instances in which 
Congress seems to have fallen short of the ideal of taking states’ 
interests to heart.76 This body of scholarship identifies examples of 
political process failure that lead to a call to the judiciary to force 
Congress to address its shortcoming. Roderick Hills, for instance, 
observes that “diseconomies of scale” plague the federal legislative 
process, preventing representatives from addressing important 
issues.77 Hills’s normative endorsement of the “presumption against 
preemption” statutory canon reflects his belief that the presumption 
would improve the legislative process as a whole,78 and thus his view 
 
strike the appropriate state/federal balance (particularly in areas of traditional state 
regulation) . . . .”); Mendelson, supra note 39, at 768 (“[T]he fact that members of Congress 
come from particular districts and states probably does give them a particular incentive to focus 
on state interests that have especially regional aspects.”); Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing 
Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 781, 797 (2008) (“[W]hether state law should be preempted is 
best characterized as a subjective ‘political’ decision that is most appropriately made by 
Congress, the most politically representative branch.”); Peter J. Smith, Pennhurst, Chevron, and 
the Spending Power, 110 YALE L.J. 1187, 1202 (2001) (arguing that the reliance on state voter 
support makes federal congressional representatives, “whom the voters may remove from office 
if they fail adequately to respect state prerogatives,” accountable to the states in federalism 
determinations); Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 
1385 (2001) (asserting that the presumption against preemption protects federalism by 
“forc[ing] Congress to make a deliberative political decision about how far it wants to intrude 
on state autonomy, and . . . mak[ing] sure that all the states’ potential defenders have notice of 
what is at stake,” and by “reinforc[ing] institutional checks by requiring Congress to make the 
decision, with all the procedural hurdles and roadblocks that process entails”). 
 75. In this vein, Kramer has challenged “those who would persist in defending judicial 
intervention . . . to explain why institutional arrangements that have worked for more than two 
centuries have suddenly ceased to do so.” Kramer, supra note 73, at 290. 
 76. For such an argument in a different field, see Peter H. Schuck & John Williams, 
Removing Criminal Aliens: The Pitfalls and Promises of Federalism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 367, 422–54 (1999). 
 77. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2007) (quoting VINCENT OSTROM, ROBERT BISH 
& ELINOR OSTROM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 97–98 (1988)). Hills argues 
that a large and politically diverse body can be prone to counterproductive gridlock on 
important issues. Id. at 10–16. 
 78. See id. at 1 (arguing that “an anti-preemption rule of statutory construction has benefits 
for the national lawmaking process”). But see Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 11, 
at 255 n.140 (“As a theoretical matter . . . one could employ either a strong pro- or anti-
preemption default (or presumption) for court decisionmaking. . . . Ultimately, it is an empirical 
claim whether one or the other default position would lead to greater mobilization of the public, 
leading to some congressional action.”); Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, 
at 450–51 n.4 (“While Hills’s account might explain issues that fail to reach the congressional 
agenda, such as bills that die in committee, it has far less explanatory power in the situation—
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departs from the conventional view that such a default rule simply 
protects “state interests,” however defined. Hills has faith that such 
an antipreemption presumption (akin to Einer Elhauge’s 
“preference-eliciting default rules,” which Hills endorses) would 
promote “an open and vigorous debate on the floor of Congress.”79 
Ultimately, these scholars share Wechsler’s unwavering faith in 
Congress—in theory if not in practice—as the institution best 
positioned to guard states’ interests. Some scholars attribute 
Congress’s comparative superiority to legislative inertia, a natural 
safeguard against too much federal law.80 For others, Congress truly 
represents the aspirational goal of robust engagement with state 
regulatory interests.81 
B. Agencies: States’ New Turf 
The flip side of the Wechsler-inspired celebration of Congress—
as an institution whose actions are both public and accountable, 
encouraging widespread participation of all interested parties—is the 
pillorying of agencies. On this view, agencies often act swiftly, hidden 
from public view, in a process largely impenetrable to interested 
parties. Nina Mendelson, for example, charges that, unlike Congress, 
agencies are specialized institutions.82 Thus, even when interested 
parties are represented in the agency decisionmaking process, 
 
dominant in products liability preemption—where the issue is squarely before Congress (on a 
repeat basis no less) and Congress manages to speak out of both sides of its mouth. Instead, it 
seems more plausible that Congress affirmatively punts the issue to courts and/or agencies.”). 
 79. Hills, supra note 77, at 28; see also EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: 
HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 152–53 (2008) (advocating for the use of 
“preference-eliciting default rules”). 
 80. Young, supra note 74, at 1361–62 (citing Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A 
Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1261 (1996)); see also Bradford R. Clark, 
Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1422 
(2008) (“[Congressional] procedures were designed to preserve the governance prerogatives of 
the states both by making federal law relatively difficult to adopt and by assigning this task 
solely to actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 77, at 28–36 (arguing in favor of a “presumption against 
preemption” to force Congress to act by mobilizing business groups to lobby Congress to act, 
leading to a robust national debate of preemption issues); Young, supra note 74, at 1389 
(arguing that “resistance norms” such as requiring a clear statement rule before countenancing 
preemption will force Congress to debate what exactly is at stake, giving notice to those 
impacted); see also Mendelson, supra note 46, at 710 (making the point that requiring Congress 
to get involved will mitigate the risk that federalism interests would be eviscerated incidentally). 
 82. Mendelson, supra note 46, at 717. 
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agencies take little heed of interests outside their expertise.83 Cass 
Sunstein, appointed by President Barack Obama as head of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), has captured 
the collective unease toward agency decisionmaking: “While there is 
no good reason to think that a reinvigorated nondelegation doctrine 
would improve the operation of modern regulation, it is entirely 
reasonable to think that for certain kinds of decisions, merely 
executive decisions are not enough.”84 
Most of the comparative institutional debate—especially those 
voices that extol the virtues of Congress over agencies on federalism 
grounds—focuses on so-called “abstract federalism”85 values. 
Consider, for example, Thomas Merrill’s trenchant critique of 
agencies: 
Agencies are specialized institutions, intensely focused on the details 
of the particular statutory regimes they are charged with 
administering. By design and tradition, they are not expected to 
ponder larger structural issues such as the relative balance of 
authority between the federal and state governments, the 
importance of preserving state autonomy, the value of allowing 
policy to vary in accordance with local conditions, or the systemic 
advantages of permitting state experimentation with divergent 
approaches to social problems.86 
Agencies in the pursuit of narrow policy goals, in other words, are 
blind to the import of the greater structure of governance. 
My focus instead is on a more concrete federalism value, namely, 
giving heed to state regulatory interests and how they interact with 
 
 83. Id. at 717–18; see also Mendelson, supra note 39, at 787–89 (arguing that agencies are 
not well equipped to evaluate the overall distribution of governmental authority as compared to 
Congress and the Judiciary); Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and 
Theories of Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 13, 27 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009) 
(“[A]gencies lack the expertise to evaluate the federal-state balance . . . .”). 
 84. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 338 (2000). Sunstein 
also points out that “certain decisions are ordinarily expected to be made by the national 
legislature, with its various institutional safeguards, and not via the executive alone.” Id. at 343; 
see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 765 
(2007) (suggesting that courts should not defer to agencies for “extraordinary questions”). 
 85. See Mendelson, supra note 39, at 782; see also id. at 741 (“Federalism values, such as 
ensuring core state regulatory authority and autonomy, are important and can be protected 
through political processes.”). 
 86. Brief of the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Laws, 
Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) 
(No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 3851615. 
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federal regulatory schemes. Focusing on these interests, it is not so 
clear, as either a positive or normative matter, that states are better 
off fighting on Congress’s turf, as opposed to that of agencies. For 
starters, Congress has essentially sat on the sideline of the products 
liability preemption debate. One might easily argue that Congress has 
altogether abdicated responsibility in this realm. Particularly in the 
area of health and safety, where the preemption issue is squarely 
before Congress (on a repeat basis no less), Congress tends to 
“speak[] out of both sides of its mouth”87—simultaneously 
promulgating preemption clauses along with “savings clauses,” which, 
for all intents and purposes, is tantamount to inaction.88 
When Congress does weigh in on the debate in a more resolute 
fashion, it is likely to decide preemption on an all-or-nothing basis.89 
 
 87. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 450–51 n.4. 
 88. Id. at 450. Nor is there reason to be sanguine about the possibility that Congress, 
though initially ambiguous, will react more decisively following judicial decisions. See Note, 
New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional 
Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1612–13 (2007) 
(examining congressional responses to Supreme Court preemption decisions between 1983 and 
2003 and finding that, of 127 Court cases pertaining to preemption of state law, Congress 
overruled only two of the decisions, and partially overruled a third). 
  Whereas relatively unexplored (with a few notable exceptions) in the legal literature, 
congressional inaction, or calculated ambiguity, is a subject of robust discussion in the political 
science literature. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not 
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2353–54 (2006) (describing how political parties encourage 
Congress to abstain from action when both the executive and legislative branches are controlled 
by the same party); Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 
117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 148 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/2007/12/10/pildes.html 
(arguing that reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act in 2006 was a prime example of 
congressional abdication); see also Morris P. Fiorina, Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: 
Legal Process or Administrative Process?, 39 PUB. CHOICE 33, 47 (1982) (examining 
congressional incentives to delegate decisionmaking power to agencies and noting that, under 
the “shift the responsibility model,” “[b]y charging an agency with the implementation of a 
general regulatory mandate, legislators . . . avoid or at least disguise their responsibility for the 
consequences of the decisions ultimately made” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Kenneth 
A. Shepsle, The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition, 66 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 555, 567 (1972) (analyzing the argument that politicians are most likely to retain voter 
support by adopting equivocal platforms, and concluding that that theory may be true only 
when “a majority of voters is risk-acceptant (and . . . possesses intense preferences, thus 
rendering the issue ‘critical’)”). 
 89. See MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS 
DIV., 109TH CONG., CONGRESSIONAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS AND REGULATIONS 17–38 
(2006) (describing preemption provisions Congress has added to twenty-seven laws since 2001). 
The vast majority of the provisions cited in the survey simply provide absolute preemption of 
state action or common law. See, e.g., Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 926B–C (2006) (preempting concealed weapons laws for former and off-duty law 
enforcement officers); Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d 
SHARKEY IN FINAL 6/24/2009  8:54:12 AM 
2009] FEDERALISM ACCOUNTABILITY 2149 
Legislative pronouncements on preemption (or nonpreemption) are 
sledgehammers where sharp scalpels are more appropriate.90 
Congress’s blanket antipreemption provisions in the context of health 
and safety regulations91 might, in the end, prove to be Pyrrhic 
victories for state regulatory interests. Such resolute pronouncements 
of the minimal nature of federal regulation—which thereby provides 
a “floor” as opposed to a “ceiling” or “optimal” standard—create an 
accountability loophole, enabling the regulating federal agency to 
disclaim ultimate responsibility for health and safety.92 Conversely, 
preemptive federal standards might hold the agency’s feet to the fire, 
and deference to state regulatory standards (which may, themselves, 
fall short of “optimal”) may be traded off in favor of ultimate 
responsibility and accountability. 
Given Congress’s proclivity to protect national prerogatives, such 
absolute responses are (at least in theory) equally likely to cut against 
state interests as to favor them.93 Agency experts at the policy and 
 
(2006) (providing full immunity for producers of certain vaccines); Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 418 (preempting certain standards for limiting 
pollution from small engines). 
 90. David Shapiro kindly supplied several early uses of the quip: 
  The Book of Psalms: “Lord grant me the wisdom not to use a sledgehammer when 
the task bespeaketh the need of a scalpel.” 
  Hamlet to Polonius: “I can tell a sledgehammer from a scalpel when the wind is 
north, northwest.” 
  Hart & Wechsler’s First Edition: “It is clear, is it not, that the occasion calls not 
for a sledgehammer but a scalpel?” 
E-mail from David Shapiro, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law Emeritus, Harvard 
Law Sch., to Catherine Sharkey, Professor of Law, New York Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 13, 2009, 
15:11 EST) (on file with Duke Law Journal). 
 91. See, e.g., Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2008) (explaining 
the proposed “savings clause” to overturn Riegel preemption for medical devices). 
 92. Cf. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management 
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 334 (1985) (“Administrative agencies may find it 
politically convenient to disclaim final responsibility for [their] public risk choices . . . .”); Lars 
Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 
GEO. L.J. 2147, 2158 (2000) (discussing the historic practice of the FDA not to oppose judicial 
review of agency standards because the tort system served as a convenient “‘safety valve’ for 
deflecting adverse publicity” when FDA-approved products were subsequently demonstrated to 
be defective). 
 93. See Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of 
Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 951, 956–61 (2001) (detailing the congressional interests in 
expanding federal power); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double 
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 113–14 (2001) (arguing that congressional 
representatives may be hostile to state regulatory interests because federal representatives 
compete with state politicians for support from their shared constituency and “any official 
seeking to maximize his own support would seek to maximize his own [federal] regulatory 
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enforcement levels may better be able to engage with state actors in a 
more meaningful and substantive way than congressional staffers.94 
The story of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
its regulatory process pursuant to Congress’s REAL ID Act of 200595 
illustrates how agencies may very well surpass Congress on the 
accountability front. Under the REAL ID Act of 2005, a state must 
comply with various requirements before the drivers’ licenses it issues 
are deemed valid forms of federal identification.96 The Act, which 
does not contain an express preemption provision, grants regulatory 
authority to DHS but directs the secretary to consult with the states 
before issuing the requirements that the states must meet.97 In 
January 2008, the Secretary of DHS promulgated these requirements 
for the first time.98 
In tandem with doing so, DHS provided a relatively robust 
federalism impact statement, detailing the interaction and 
consultation process with state governmental entities that it had 
undertaken “in the spirit of Federalism.”99 More specifically, DHS 
described the fairly extensive consultation process that preceded the 
issuance of the final rule as follows: 
 
jurisdiction at the expense of other [state] public officials seeking support from the same 
constituents”). 
 94. See Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1971 (2008) 
(“Agencies have the potential to be both deliberative and responsive to political preferences, 
both because of their relationship to the courts and the political branches and because of their 
composition and the motivation of their staff members.”). Agency officials may have relevant 
backgrounds for taking state actors’ concerns seriously. Agency officials may also have worked 
with or in state government, providing them with a state-side perspective of relevant regulatory 
issues. See id. at 1975 (“[T]o satisfy judicial review, agencies need staff members from a 
multitude of professions who can understand the views of all greatly affected interest groups.”). 
 95. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (codified in scattered sections 
of 8 and 49 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 96. 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note (2006) (Improved Security Requirements for Drivers’ Licenses 
and Personal Identification Cards). 
 97. Id. (“All authority to issue regulations, set standards, and issue grants under this title 
shall be carried out by the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and 
the States.” (emphasis added)). A prior statute (which the 2005 Act replaced) had instead 
required a negotiated rulemaking procedure. 
 98. See id. 
 99. Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by 
Federal Agencies for Official Purposes, 73 Fed. Reg. 5272, 5329–30 (Jan. 29, 2008) (to be 
codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 37). 
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DHS held meetings and solicited input from various States and such 
stakeholders as the National Governors Association [NGA] and the 
National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL]. 
  In particular, during the comment period, DHS hosted sessions 
that were available via webcast across the country to engage State 
Governors’ chiefs of staff, homeland security directors in the States, 
and motor vehicles administrators, as well as a separate session with 
State legislators.100 
The REAL ID Negotiated Rulemaking Comment Session of 
April 16, 2007 generated a three-hundred-page transcript, which 
includes, in addition to input from the NCSL and NGA, commentary 
from the Texas Department of Public Safety, the Massachusetts 
Registry of Motor Vehicles, the California Governor’s Office, the 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, the Maine 
Secretary of State’s Office, the Michigan Secretary of State’s Office, 
the California Department of Motor Vehicles, the International 
Association of the Chiefs of Police, and the Florida Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.101 
But DHS’s ostensibly active engagement with state 
governmental entities could not mask what these governmental 
entities perceived to be Congress’s trouncing of state regulatory 
interests in the structure of the Act itself.102 Before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee hearing on preemption, NCSL stated: 
The Real ID Act of 2005 was added to a must-pass supplemental 
spending bill for the war on terrorism and tsunami relief. With its 
enactment, the Real ID Act repealed an existing negotiated 
rulemaking process for establishing [driver’s license/identification] 
standards, in which NCSL participated, and instead put into statute 
prescriptive mandates. The negotiated rulemaking process would 
 
 100. Id. at 5330. 
 101. The transcript is available online at Regulations.gov. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, DHS-2006-0030-1839, REAL ID NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING COMMENT SESSION 
(2007), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=Document 
Detail&o=090000648023072e. 
 102. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Count Down to Real ID, 
http://www.ncsl.org/RealID/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (counting down to the date REAL ID 
becomes effective and providing a number of resources detailing state opposition to the law). 
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have made the development of standards a partnership instead of a 
preemption of existing state practices.103 
NCSL was thus nostalgic for the institutional arrangement of 
negotiated agency rulemaking under the previous statute. 
Presumably, at least on this issue, NCSL was confident that it could 
have had more influence over the agency than over Congress. The 
NGA likewise touted the agency, writing in a letter to leaders in the 
House and Senate, “DHS listened to governors and other state 
stakeholders and improved its draft regulations.”104 Indeed, the 
agency did more than simply listen; according to NCSL, the proposed 
rules “incorporated a number of recommendations made to DHS by 
NCSL, governors and motor vehicle administrators.”105 
This example invites a more generalized analysis of the 
comparative capacity of Congress and agencies to engage in an 
accountable decisionmaking process, and to respond to state 
 
 103. Sen. Hearing on Regulatory Preemption, supra note 21, at 148–49 (statement of Donna 
Stone, President, National Conference of State Legislatures). 
 104. Letter from Governors Tim Pawlenty & Edward G. Rendell to Senator Harry Reid, 
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, et al. (Mar. 20, 2008), available at http://www.nga.org/portal/site/ 
nga/menuitem.cb6e7818b34088d18a278110501010a0/?vgnextoid=e9986c653ecc8110VgnVCM10
00001a01010aRCRD. The governors did, however, voice criticisms of Congress: 
Governors supported initial legislation to enhance driver’s licenses through a 
cooperative negotiated rulemaking. When that legislation was repealed and replaced 
with REAL ID, governors objected and called on the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and Congress to fix and fund REAL ID by fashioning reasonable 
rules and providing adequate funding to cover the cost of this new national 
mandate. . . . Now, if REAL ID is to become a reality, Congress and the 
Administration must provide sufficient funding to cover states’ cost[s] and preserve 
flexibility for states to manage their unique systems. 
Id. That sizeable costs are imposed on the states is a significant issue. A study conducted by the 
NCSL, NGA, and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators estimates that 
the cost to the states will exceed eleven billion dollars. NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, NAT’L 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES & AM. ASS’N OF MOTOR VEHICLE MFRS., THE REAL 
ID ACT: NATIONAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 3 (2006), http://www.ncsl.org/print/statefed/Real_ID_ 
Impact_Report_FINAL_Sept19.pdf. 
 105. Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, The History of Federal Requirements for State 
Issued Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards, http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sctran/ 
History_of_DL_Reform.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009); see also Understanding the Realities of 
REAL ID: A Review of Efforts to Secure Drivers’ Licenses and Identification Cards: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, & the 
District of Columbia of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th 
Cong. 22 (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_ 
senate_hearings&docid=f:34415.pdf (statement of Leticia Van de Putte, President, National 
Conference of State Legislatures, and State Senator, Texas) (“NCSL acknowledges that the 
draft regulations incorporate a number of our recommendations made in the September 2006 
report.”). 
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regulatory concerns raised by governmental entities. I have argued 
that “[w]ith respect to answering the key regulatory policy issue at the 
heart of the preemption query—namely, whether there in fact should 
be a uniform federal regulatory policy—federal agencies emerge as 
the institutional actor best equipped to provide the answer.”106 
Specifically, I proposed an “agency reference model” that 
directs attention to a repository of agency information—ideally 
reflecting a broad range of views, having been vetted by expert and 
public opinion—focusing on the precise nature of the agency’s 
regulatory cost-benefit (or risk-risk) determinations as well as the 
economic consequences of various determinations and the effects of 
state regulation on federal regulatory schemes.107  
With respect to promoting federalism values, “agencies . . . emerge as 
the institutional actor of choice, to the extent that they effectively 
represent state interests in our modern administrative state.”108 
Several other scholars have echoed the suggestion that states’ 
federalism interests may fare relatively well in the hands of agencies 
as compared to Congress.109 Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld dissect 
three common arguments for congressional superiority—
transparency, deliberative processes, and accountability—and 
contend, contra conventional wisdom, that agencies, as measured by 
 
 106. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 477. 
 107. Id. at 485. 
 108. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 11, at 252, 252–53 (sketching out a 
“federalism-inspired” model for agency participation in preemption decisions, based upon a 
“federal-state dialogue” pursuant to congressional and executive agency mandates to consult 
with state and local authorities). 
 109. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David 
Schoenbrod, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 775, 781–90 (1999) (arguing that agencies are superior 
venues for accountability in a number of important respects). 
  Scholars—perhaps most prominently Cass Sunstein—have previously argued that the 
courts and Congress play essential roles in guiding and ensuring accountability on the part of 
agencies. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions of Administration, 1987 BYU L. 
REV. 927, 941 (Congress is capable of providing “relatively clear guidelines” that ensure that 
agencies remain accountable and that “statutes [will not] be defeated in the implementation 
process”); Cass R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72 
VA. L. REV. 271, 272–77 (1986) (arguing that, since the passage of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, courts have taken advantage of an improved understanding of the purposes of regulation 
and the function of agencies to monitor and prod agencies in the direction of efficiency, 
effectiveness, and accountability); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2110–12 (1990) (embracing courts’ use of “[c]lear statement” rules 
designed, as a quasi substitute for the nondelegation doctrine, either to ensure clear 
congressional statements on issues that have constitutional dimensions or to ensure that 
Congress deliberates on the issue). 
SHARKEY IN FINAL 6/24/2009  8:54:12 AM 
2154 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2125 
these criteria, do better.110 On transparency, Galle and Seidenfeld 
compare the opacity of congressional decisionmaking, often the 
product of logrolling and backroom lobbying, to the relative visibility 
of the decisionmaking process of agencies, governed by statutes 
mandating transparent determination and reasoned explanation.111 As 
for deliberative process, Galle and Seidenfeld contend that the 
legislative process “generally is not as conducive to deliberation as it 
is to compromise and division of spoils.”112 In the face of the rampant 
practice of logrolling coupled with the high cost to congressional 
committees of obtaining accurate information, true legislative 
deliberation is an ideal rather than a reality.113 By contrast, the 
administrative process, coupled with the prospect of judicial review, 
forces agencies to consider counterarguments and alternatives.114 
Finally, Galle and Seidenfeld tackle accountability, which they 
measure by responsiveness to states’ interests, broadly defined.115 
They chip away at the Wechslerian armor by pointing out that, 
although Congress is directly elected, the spread between voters’ true 
preferences and a representative legislator’s particular votes may be 
quite large.116 And they advert to the numerous political checks on 
agency action by both Congress and the president.117 
Gillian Metzger has likewise challenged the wisdom that 
“Congress offers significantly more sensitivity to state regulatory 
prerogatives than federal agencies.”118 Nor is there any reason—in 
 
 110. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 94, at 1948–83. Mark Seidenfeld has long been an 
advocate of broad delegations of authority to agencies. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic 
Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1551 (1992) (“I 
believe that civic republicanism provides a strong justification for the assignment of broad 
policymaking discretion to administrative agencies.”). 
 111. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 94, at 1949–61. 
 112. Id. at 1962. 
 113. Id. at 1962–68. 
 114. Id. at 1971–79. 
 115. Id. at 1979–84. 
 116. Id. at 1980 n.194 (describing how voters’ information is imperfect, causing legislators’ 
positions to differ substantially from their constituents’ preferences on any particular issue). 
 117. Id. at 1980–84 (generally describing the various mechanisms of executive and legislative 
control of agencies); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2284–303 (2001) (describing three techniques of presidential control: “review,” 
“directives,” and “appropriation”); Charles Tiefer, Congressional Oversight of the Clinton 
Administration and Congressional Procedure, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 205–15 (1998) (describing 
congressional controls over agencies including: Senate floor procedures, committee 
jurisdictions, appropriation procedures, and the congressional budget process). 
 118. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 
2080–81 (2008). 
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theory or practice—to presume that agencies will be bent on eroding 
state power.119 Furthermore, as Metzger reminds, Congress simply 
cannot resolve all federal-state questions; on sheer practical grounds, 
agencies must bear at least some of this burden. Recognizing that 
“questions about the appropriate federal-state balance are not easily 
separated from substantive policy determinations on which agencies 
do have expertise,” she concludes this is not necessarily a bad state of 
affairs.120 
III. AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY 
Agencies, at least in theory, are equipped to make nuanced, 
flexible determinations regarding federal-state regulatory balance, 
based upon underlying policy considerations that may vary by 
regulatory context. If one believes, as I do, that preemption is 
warranted in certain narrow contexts, such as where the relevant 
federal agency has carefully considered the relevant health or safety 
risk at issue, but not as a blanket rule, then the record of the agency’s 
regulatory review must play a pivotal role in the analysis. These are 
 
 119. This is a frequent claim in the legal literature. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-
Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2127 (2002) (“[A]gencies have 
certain biases (such as a bias in favor of expanding their power) that might distort their 
interpretations [of vague statutory delegations].”); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and 
Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 756 (2008) (“Not every agency is bent on empire 
building or is captured by the firms it regulates. But these phenomena are not unheard of and 
warrant caution before automatically deferring to agency judgments about the need for 
preemption. Agencies may also resent the implicit competition from other sources of regulatory 
authority like states.”); Rosen, supra note 74, at 801–02 (“[T]here are good reasons to be 
skeptical of a bureaucracy’s decision regarding its own powers.”). 
  But the claim of agency self-aggrandizement stands empirically on shaky ground; 
moreover, it does not appear to hold even in the preemption context. See, e.g., Sharkey, 
Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 475 (“Counterintuitively, federal agencies have 
been just as likely, if not more likely, to argue against preemption in the products liability 
realm.”); id. at 475–77, 486–90 (discussing numerous examples); see also Daryl J. Levinson, 
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 932–34 (2005) 
(pointing to a litany of scholarship that suggests that agency bureaucrats do not necessarily try 
to expand their own power but are rather controlled by a combination of self-interest, 
professionalism, and political oversight); Metzger, supra note 118, at 2078–79 (“Too many 
instances exist of federal agencies refusing to preempt or seeking to expand state regulatory 
autonomy to conclude that federal agencies are categorically insensitive or hostile to preserving 
a state regulatory role.” (citing Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist 
Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 43, 73 (2006)); Greve 
& Klick, supra, at 73 (observing that, during the Rehnquist Court, the Solicitor General took “a 
pro-preemption position in [only] 39 of 95 preemption cases, or about 40 percent.”). 
 120. Metzger, supra note 118, at 2082. 
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the underpinnings of my “agency reference model” for judicial 
preemption determinations.121 
Part IV of this Article addresses “agency-forcing” reform 
measures, so called because the substantive blueprint for action—
which I explore in this Part—already exists. Executive Order 13,132, 
titled “Federalism,” was issued by President William Clinton in 
August 1999 to “ensure that the principles of federalism established 
by the Framers guide the executive departments and agencies in the 
formulation and implementation of policies.”122 It recognized that 
“the States possess unique authorities, qualities, and abilities to meet 
the needs of the people and should function as laboratories of 
democracy.”123 The Executive Order requires that federal agencies, to 
the extent possible, refrain from limiting state policy options, consult 
with states before taking action that might restrict states’ policy 
options, and take such actions only when clear constitutional 
authority exists and the problem is of national scope.124 
In addition to such lofty rhetoric, the Executive Order outlines 
specific requirements to be met before an agency may issue a 
preemptive regulation. An agency shall be clear in stating the 
preemptive effect of its policies in the notice of proposed rulemaking 
and, should it change position, the agency shall reopen the comment 
period before issuing a final rule. The agency is to “provide all 
affected State and local officials notice and an opportunity for 
appropriate participation in the proceedings.”125 The aim of the 
 
 121. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 477–502; Catherine M. 
Sharkey, What Riegel Portends for FDA Preemption of State Law Products Liability Claims, 103 
NW. U. L. REV. 437, 440–62 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, What Riegel Portends] (extending the 
agency reference model by prescribing searching judicial review of evidence taken from the 
FDA’s regulatory record to substantiate implied preemption findings). 
  Moreover, the United States Supreme Court (I would argue) embraced this approach 
in Wyeth v. Levine. See infra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 122. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). Executive Order 
13,132 applies to all agencies, save independent agencies, such as the CPSC, which nonetheless 
are “encouraged to comply.” Independent agencies, moreover, are subject to Executive Order 
12,988, signed into effect by President Clinton in February 1996, which directs agencies to 
“specif[y] in clear language the preemptive effect, if any, to be given to the law.” Exec. Order 
No. 12,988, 61 Fed. Reg. 4729, 4731 (Feb. 5, 1996). 
 123. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,255. 
 124. Id. at 43,256. Further, section 4(a) requires agencies to “construe . . . a Federal statute 
to preempt State law only where the statute contains an express preemption provision or there 
is some other clear evidence that the Congress intended preemption of State law, or where the 
exercise of State authority conflicts with the exercise of Federal authority under the Federal 
statute.” Id. at 43,257. 
 125. Id. at 43,257. 
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Executive Order reaches beyond establishing a robust notice-and-
comment process; the goal is to engage states on the most 
fundamental threshold issue of whether there should be a preemptive 
rule—that is, a national rule that sets an optimal standard that serves 
as both a floor and ceiling on regulation. The overarching goal, then, 
is to facilitate a dialogue with the states concerning the nature of 
preemptive rules and the form they should take. Agencies are 
charged with the duty to establish an “accountable process to ensure 
meaningful and timely input” from the states.126 Before issuing a 
proposed rule, agencies must consult with appropriate state and local 
officials to avoid conflicts between state and federal laws.127 
As Part I vividly demonstrated, agencies have employed myriad 
crafty strategies to bypass the executive federalism mandate, 
including the most deceptive bait-and-switch tactics. But, as explored 
in Part II, any response to federal agency overreaching in the 
preemption context that calls for simply pushing the decision back to 
Congress is misguided on normative grounds and untenable for 
practical purposes. 
This Part first addresses the question of who represents state 
regulatory interests—a threshold question that, ironically, is all too 
often ignored in debates centering on abstract federalism values such 
as autonomy and democratic accountability. With respect to 
regulation of consumer health and safety, the representation issue is 
especially thorny. Typically, preemption in this realm involves the 
displacement of state common law (and state regulations to a lesser 
degree). There is no a priori representative of state interests served 
by the common law, nor is there any consensus on whether the 
relevant interests are regulatory or compensatory in nature. Several 
contenders, including drug safety divisions within state-level 
departments of health, state attorneys general (and their umbrella 
coordinating association, the National Association of Attorneys 
General (NAAG)), and state governmental entities such as the 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) (and the other 
“Big Seven” organizations) are put forward. 
With potential vanquishers of state regulatory interests 
identified, this Part then proposes reforms in line with Executive 
Order 13,132, taking up an overhaul of notice-and-comment 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 43,256 (stating that agencies should, “to the extent practicable,” consult with state 
and local authorities “before any such action is implemented”). 
SHARKEY IN FINAL 6/24/2009  8:54:12 AM 
2158 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2125 
rulemaking, followed by guidelines for establishing an effective 
partnership between federal agencies and the states. 
A. Who Represents State Regulatory Interests? 
A prerequisite to any discussion of effective agency consultation 
and collaboration with the states is identification of the relevant 
stakeholders: Who precisely represents state regulatory interests? In 
the context of the regulation of consumer health and safety, this is a 
formidable issue.128 The absence of any well-developed regulatory 
apparatus at the state level, similar to that which exists, for example, 
in the context of environmental regulation or banking regulation, has 
two significant implications.129 First, by and large, preemption 
determinations will displace state common law liability, as opposed to 
state legislative or regulatory standards. Second, and relatedly, it is by 
no means clear who represents the interests served by state tort law. 
State tort law wears at least two hats—one compensatory, the other 
regulatory.130 The increasingly dominant law and economics view 
posits a regulatory role for tort law: namely, that it deters excessive 
risk taking on the part of manufacturers by forcing them to 
internalize the costs of the harms they inflict upon others in situations 
in which they fail to take cost-justified preventative measures. 
Compensation of injured victims is a significant component of the tort 
system, but, on this view, it is the mechanism whereby optimal 
deterrence is achieved and not an independent goal, at least 
untethered from the deterrence objective. A threshold question 
arises, then, with respect to suitable representatives of state 
regulatory interests: should it be those who represent injured victims 
(potential and actual) or those who are engaged in health and safety 
regulation at the state level, or both? 
 
 128. It may also go a long way toward explaining the absence of any models of “cooperative 
federalism” in this realm. Cf. Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, 
and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1695–703 (2001) (presenting a 
model whereby state agencies play a role exercising discretion within a federal regulatory 
regime). In other words, a precondition for such cooperative federalism is likely the existence of 
intricately linked state and federal agencies, with built-in incentives and opportunities for 
communication as well as constructive collaboration. 
 129. The existence of state regulatory agencies by no means assures that their resistance to 
preemption will be successful; the more modest point is simply that it is easier to locate the 
representatives of competing state interests in that context. 
 130. For an elaboration of “the two faces of tort law,” see Sharkey, Products Liability 
Preemption, supra note 6, at 459–71. 
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The realm of environmental regulation, as administered by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), provides a constructive 
contrast. First, congressional acts mandate enforcement by state 
regulatory agencies, establishing an institutional framework for 
agency-state cooperation.131 As Brian Galle has noted, “federal 
dependence on the knowledge and resources of cooperating state 
regulators” ensures a certain degree of federal agency sensitivity to 
state interests.132 State environmental agencies have presumably 
become more adept by virtue of this “cooperative federalism.”133 
 
 131. The Clean Air Act, for example, requires that states establish plans to help ensure that 
each state implements and enforces the statute’s target emissions reductions. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7410(a)(1) (2006). State environmental agencies enforce these policies under this statutory 
mandate. And under the Clean Water Act, state environmental agencies can be deputized to 
issue federal permits in lieu of the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(a) (2006); see also DENISE 
SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 7–10 (1997) [hereinafter SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY] (describing ways that states implement federal environmental statutes); Envr. Council 
of States, Delegation by Environmental Act, http://www.ecos.org/section/states/enviro_actlist 
(last visited May 13, 2009) (noting that “[a]s of 2001, over 75% of the federal environmental 
programs that can be delegated have been delegated to the States” and that the Clean Air Act 
has been delegated by the EPA to all fifty states). 
  Congressional mandates in the environmental regulation context set the parameters of 
“a matrix composed of distributed powers and necessary interdependencies,” through which 
“state and federal actors find bargaining and negotiation standard fare.” Denise Scheberle, The 
Evolving Matrix of Environmental Federalism and Intergovernmental Relationships, 35 PUBLIUS 
69, 70 (2005) [hereinafter Scheberle, The Evolving Matrix] (citing DANIEL J. ELAZAR, 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (3d ed. 1984)); id. (“[T]he collaborative 
matrix has not disappeared but has been reconstructed by the prevalence of bargaining, growing 
managerial sophistication on the part of state and local actors, the opening of more venues for 
collaboration, and real limits on federal enforcement ability.”).  
  The EPA’s internal guidelines on Executive Order 13,132 make explicit reference to 
this federal-state interdependence. EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, GUIDANCE ON 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132: FEDERALISM 21 (2008), available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/ 
111908rb1.pdf (emphasizing the importance of agency consultation with state and local 
government officials given that “[state and local] governments carry out most of the day-to-day 
administration of many national environmental programs.”). 
 132. Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear 
Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 193 (2004); see 
also Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983?: A 
Theoretical Approach, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 163, 198 (2003) (describing agency-state interaction 
as a “collaborative enterprise between federal and state bureaucrats”); David Freeman 
Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional Analysis of the 
Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1235–36 (2004) 
(arguing that federal agencies may be soliticious of state interests given that field-level 
administrators frequently rely on participation by state agencies and personnel). But see 
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1225, 1227 (2001) (“The state bureaucrat cannot be trusted to lobby vigorously against 
federal mandates in the federal administrative process.”). Hills also explains that state and 
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The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, by contrast, does not 
mandate any form of state participation. And, unlike the EPA, which 
has state-level counterpart agencies with which it can partner, the 
FDA has no specific state-level counterpart. A few states do appear 
to have agencies that complement the FDA through inspection, 
research, and regulation of drugs and devices within the state. 
California has an extensive network of such agencies, many of which 
focus narrowly enough to provide thoughtful input on quick notice in 
the event of solicitation from the FDA. In the realm of drugs, 
California’s Department of Public Health has its own Drug Safety 
Program division, which monitors the drug, cosmetic, and “other 
consumer product industries” to ensure that “products are not 
adulterated, misbranded or falsely advertised.”134 New York, although 
it does not have an equally strong drug and device monitoring 
framework in place,135 does have a strong food safety regulatory 
framework that would seem to be equally appropriate for targeted 
 
federal regulators “often share more in common with each other than they do with the level of 
government by which they are employed.” Id. 
 133. Another distinguishing factor may be the culture within the agency. Apparently, in the 
late 1990s, the EPA highlighted the executive order on federalism, assigned an ombudsman-like 
role to a designated federalism liaison to oversee compliance with the order, held meetings 
about how to deal with the executive order, and developed internal guidelines for compliance. 
Telephone Interview with Susan Frederick, Fed. Affairs Counsel for the Nat’l Conference of 
State Legislatures (July 17, 2008). 
  In 1993, the EPA formed the State/EPA Capacity Steering Committee to improve the 
federal-state partnership in environmental programs. See SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 131, at 13; see also Scherberle, The Evolving Matrix, 
supra note 131, at 74–75 (noting the existence of the State/EPA Capacity Steering Committee, 
designed to “lead a federal-state dialog on creating and maintaining an environmental 
‘partnership’ between state and federal officials”). 
  Consistent with this past practice, the EPA issued internal guidelines on compliance 
with Executive Order 13,132 in November 2008. See EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, 
GUIDANCE ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132: FEDERALISM, supra note 131, at 2 (“For some 
actions, including those which may not have federalism implications . . . EPA policy is broader 
than the Executive Order, reflecting EPA’s commitment to early and meaningful 
intergovernmental consultation.”). 
 134. Cal. Dep’t of Pub. Health, Drug Safety Program, http://www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/ 
manfprocdistrib/Pages/Drug.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). 
 135. See generally New York State Dep’t of Health, http://www.health.state.ny.us/ (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2009). Most of New York’s health-related agencies seem more targeted toward 
providing services to patients, such as the state’s drug pricing program, which provides 
consumers with information and pricing on the leading prescriptions for given ailments. See 
New York State Dep’t of Health, Prescription Drug Price Website, http://rx.nyhealth.gov/pdpw/ 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2009). 
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solicitations on the part of the FDA.136 Although all states have a 
health commission of some kind, the scope and reach of that agency’s 
authority and, in turn, its efficacy as a contributor to rulemaking 
procedures at the federal level, varies from state to state.137 
Every state, moreover, has a codified version of the Food Drug 
and Cosmetic Act that attorneys general may enforce at the state 
level. The National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) is the 
central agency for the coordination of legal policymaking and federal 
litigation by state attorneys general. In addition, NAAG organizes 
standing committees on particular areas of state concern, such as 
environmental protection, consumer protection, securities regulation, 
and regulation of the insurance industry.138 
Existing state governmental bodies are also potential partners 
with the federal agencies. The “Big Seven”—consisting of NCSL, the 
National Governors Association, the National Association of 
Counties, the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of 
 
 136. As the Department of Agriculture and Markets’ largest division, New York’s Division 
of Food Safety and Inspection monitors, among other things, food labeling and advertising, and 
hosts information seminars for the food industry on safety and labeling. N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Agric. & Mkts., Div. of Food Safety & Inspection, http://www.agmkt.state.ny.us/FS/FSHome. 
html (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). It samples products for safety and provides services similar to 
those of the FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition. See Food & Drug Admin., 
Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition: Overview, http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/ 
cfsan4.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2009). 
 137. For links to all state health departments, see State & Local Gov’t on the Net, State 
Health Dep’ts and Servs., http://www.statelocalgov.net/50states-health.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 
2009). All states appear to have some agency body geared toward prescription drug tracking 
and monitoring. The health commissioner or director typically oversees the state’s public health 
program, which may include a drug program and food inspection program. The title “drug 
program director” is a position usually held at the county level within certain states. Most state 
agencies, however, are primarily directed at enforcement; it is unclear whether they would have 
the incentive or resources to respond to requests from the FDA for comment on issues 
pertaining to preemption. 
 138. See Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General 
as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 540 (1994) (“These committees encourage 
standardization of state enforcement standards under federal laws and draft model state 
statutes. Environmental protection, public land management, antitrust law, consumer 
protection, charitable trusts and solicitations . . . securities regulation, regulation of the 
insurance industry, and utility rate-making are some of the areas addressed by NAAG standing 
committees since 1980.”). 
  NAAG, moreover, also lobbies to affect national legislation. Judith Resnik provides 
one example whereby NAAG mobilized to influence the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act. See 
Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalism from the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class 
Action Fairness Act: “The Political Safeguards” of Aggregate Translocal Actions, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1929, 1961–63 (2008) (describing how NAAG’s proposal to protect state actors and 
expand opportunities for state attorney general participation was implemented). 
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Mayors, the Council of State Governments, and the International 
City/County Management Association—are voluntary organizations 
of government officials that meet on a regular basis with the goal of 
influencing lawmaking and law enforcement at the national level.139 
These organizations are poised to comment, at a collective level that 
accounts for all (or some critical number of) states’ perspectives, 
rather than represent the unique (and perhaps idiosyncratic) interests 
of any one.140 Such an aggregate perspective has much to recommend 
it, especially when a key concern in the debate is whether a particular 
state seeks to exploit its regulatory framework to impose negative 
externalities upon other states.141 
NAAG has challenged federal agencies’ decisions to preempt 
state law, often via amicus briefs.142 Historically, NAAG has focused 
its opposition to preemption in areas of robust state regulation, such 
as environmental law, banking, and consumer protection. But it has 
 
 139. Resnik et al. have similarly argued in favor of giving such governmental entities, which 
they refer to as “TOGAS,” or translocal organizations of government actors, regulatory power 
through consultation with agencies and inclusion in the policymaking process. See Judith 
Resnik, Joshua Civin & Joseph Frueh, Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, 
Federalism, and Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAS), 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
709, 776–80 (2008). Resnik et al. come down decidedly against preemption, to spur local 
experimentation. Id. But so long as these powerful governmental bodies play an active role in 
regulatory policymaking, I see no reason why preemption need be taken off the table in all 
circumstances. 
 140. Collective actions taken by these state intergovernmental organizations have been 
described as “bottom up” federalism, through which local initiatives—once they reach a critical 
threshold—promote parallel action by state actors. See, e.g., Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, 
Bottom-Up Federalism: The Diffusion of Antismoking Policies from U.S. Cities to States, 50 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 825, 828, 840 (2006) (attributing the emergence of anti-smoking initiatives at the 
state and federal levels, in part, to strong anti-smoking advocacy at the local level); Judith 
Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 
1105, 1122 (2008) (discussing the more than eight hundred mayors who signed onto a U.S. 
Conference of Mayors’ agreement that sets target dates for compliance with Kyoto Protocol air 
quality standards). 
 141. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. 
REV. 1353, 1370 (2006) (“Congress frequently regulates activities because state regulation, or 
lack of regulation, of those activities imposes external costs on neighboring states.”). 
  Critics counter that such an aggregate approach sacrifices local and state 
experimentation—a core principle of federalism. Moreover, some contend that such state 
intergovernmental organizations are prone to suppression of minority views as well as 
susceptible to capture by outside interests. Cf. Clayton, supra note 138, at 543–44; Michael S. 
Greve, Cartel Federalism?: Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys General, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
99, 100–01 (2005) (suggesting that the “extraordinary extent of state consensus” on antitrust 
actions has led to “a partial surrender of state regulatory autonomy” and a concomitant refusal 
to challenge sister states’ anticompetitive conduct). 
 142. See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 138, at 548–52. 
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also intervened to protest preemption of state common law.143 
Moreover, groups like NCSL rely on plaintiff and consumer advocacy 
groups—like trial lawyers, Public Citizen, and the American Civil 
Liberties Union—to communicate their interests, which enhances 
their capacity to effectively represent both the state regulatory 
interest as well as the interests of injured victims. 
More attention is due to this vexing issue of who represents state 
regulatory interests. It is critical to the success of a reform agenda 
centered on notice-and-comment rulemaking and, more broadly, on 
forging effective agency-state partnerships. 
B. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking is the means by which federal 
agencies solicit and incorporate the views of all “interested persons” 
before issuing final rules.144 It remains the case that “[a]ttitudes about 
the utility of the notice and comment process and the behavior of 
parties are likely to vary with different agencies and across different 
regulatory contexts.”145 The pessimistic view holds that the process is 
much sound and fury—leading to “voluminous comments that include 
multiple objections, criticisms, and proposed alternatives, each 
supported by lengthy studies and arguments . . . including many 
conflicting studies that challenged the major factual predicates for the 
proposed rule”146—with little constructive substance. But it strikes me 
that it is far too soon to give up on the process’s potential to force 
agencies, in line with Executive Order 13,132, to contend with 
competing regulatory interests and empirical claims. 
 
 143. See generally States’ Wyeth Amicus Brief, supra note 66, at *1 (“The forty-seven amici 
states, as separate sovereigns in our federal system . . . . have a fundamental interest in 
preserving the appropriate balance of authority between the states and the federal 
government. . . . In our view, courts should only rarely infer that Congress, although silent on 
the issue, nonetheless intended to displace state law where it is possible to comply with both 
state and federal law.”); see also Dan Schweitzer, Supreme Court Counsel, Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys 
Gen., Panelist Remarks at the New York University Annual Survey of American Law: Tort 
Law in the Shadow of Agency Preemption (Feb. 27, 2009) (noting that, over time, states have 
gotten increasingly interested in the preemption of state common law claims because of their 
experience with preemption in other realms, such as banking, where state agencies are explicitly 
at risk). 
 144. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). 
 145. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 11 n.27 (1997). 
 146. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 
185, 192–93 (1996). 
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1. Federalism Impact Statements.  Executive Order 13,132 
requires agencies to provide a federalism impact statement (FIS) 
whenever regulations will have “substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government.”147 An FIS should “consist[] of a 
description of the extent of the agency’s prior consultation with State 
and local officials, a summary of the nature of their concerns and the 
agency’s position supporting the need to issue the regulation, and a 
statement of the extent to which the concerns of State and local 
officials have been met.”148 
The mandate is recognized primarily in its breach. As detailed 
above in Part I.B, federal agencies have either blithely ignored their 
responsibility to provide FISs or have gone to great lengths to 
obfuscate whether their preemption determinations have any 
federalism impact whatsoever.149 
Executive Order 13,132, in sharp contrast, envisions a robust 
exchange between officials on the federal, state, and local levels. 
What this suggests is that more than a simple call for state 
participation via the agency’s provision of an FIS is needed. 
2. Solicitation of Comments.  For starters, the agency-provided 
FIS should be viewed as the beginning, not the end, of an agency’s 
consideration of affected state regulatory interests. Brazenly enough, 
the FDA has defended its failure to consult with the states on the 
grounds that it had “provided the States with an opportunity for 
appropriate participation in [one particular] rulemaking when it 
sought input from all stakeholders through publication of the 
proposed rule in the Federal Register.”150 In other words, the FDA 
makes the unlikely assumption that state representatives can and will 
comb through the Federal Register on a regular basis to search for 
potential preemption clashes. The chance that these individuals will 
 
 147. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
 148. Id. at 43,258. 
 149. The EPA stands as a counterexample. It has been at the forefront in terms of providing 
internal guidance on how to conduct a suitable FIS consistent with the principles embodied in 
Executive Order 13,132. See EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, GUIDANCE ON 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132: FEDERALISM, supra note 131, at 9. 
 150. Food Labeling: Nutrition Labeling of Dietary Supplements on a “Per Day” Basis, 71 
Fed. Reg. 74,785, 74,790 (Dec. 13, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101); Food Labeling: Nutrient 
Content Claims, Expansion of the Nutrient Content Claim “Lean,” 72 Fed. Reg. 1455, 1459 
(Jan. 12, 2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
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take on this significant burden is particularly slim where the proposed 
rule disclaims emphatically (or even tentatively) any preemptive 
effect.151 The FDA’s inconsistent stance regarding preemption thus 
likely undermines states’ incentives to engage in the rulemaking 
process. 
Several examples in which the FDA took the initiative to reach 
out to the states, however, provide some modest optimism for the 
scope of potential reform in this area. Agencies typically reserve 
direct requests for comments for situations in which the agency has 
determined that the proposed rule has an impact on federalism and, 
as such, is required under Executive Order 13,132 to seek state 
input.152 In several instances, the FDA reports that it sent notice via 
fax and email to the states to make them aware of the proposed rule, 
and gave them some period (typically one month) to respond.153 The 
FDA also cites examples of more targeted outreach, directing its 
requests for comment to “State health commissioners, State 
agriculture commissioners, food program directors, and drug program 
 
 151. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. For example, recall the FDA rule on 
nonoxynol/vaginal contraceptives, in which, contrary to the proposed rule’s tentative disclaimer, 
the final rule asserted preemptive effect. In that case, the FDA solicited comments from the 
states on May 12, 2006, via fax and email to “elected officials of State governments and their 
representatives of national organization[s].” Over-the-Counter Vaginal Contraceptive and 
Spermicide Drug Products Containing Nonoxynol 9; Required Labeling, 72 Fed. Reg. 71,769, 
71,783 (Dec. 19, 2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201); see also Skin Protectant Drug 
Products for Over-the-Counter Human Use; Reduced Labeling; Technical Amendment, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 6014, 6017 (Feb. 1, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 347) (noting that no state 
commented during the public notice-and-comment period and that FDA reached out to states 
on December 10, 2007, but received no response). 
 152. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,257. 
 153. See, e.g., Internal Analgesic, Antipyretic, and Antirheumatic Drug Products for Over-
the-Counter Human Use; Proposed Amendment of the Tentative Final Monograph; Required 
Warnings and Other Labeling, 71 Fed. Reg. 77,314, 77,345 (proposed Dec. 12, 2006) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 343) (asserting the preemptive effect of the proposed rule and 
noting that “FDA is providing an opportunity for State and local officials to comment on this 
rulemaking, and will conduct outreach to State and local government or organizations 
representing them”); see also Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, Expansion of the 
Nutrient Content Claim “Lean,” 72 Fed. Reg. at 1459 (noting that states had been contacted in 
addition to the general notice provided to all stakeholders via publication in the Federal 
Register); Food Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Dietary Fiber from Certain Foods and Heart 
Disease, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,248, 29,250 (May 22, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (noting 
that the agency contacted the states via fax and email about the intended amendment and gave 
nearly a two-month window to respond). In these latter two examples, however, the FDA had 
denied that there were federalism impacts under the proposed rules. 
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directors.”154 In most of these instances, however, the FDA reports 
that it received no responses.155 
A few examples of FDA outreach demonstrate further measures 
the agency should take to reach relevant state officials. Before 
promulgating a rule specifying labeling requirements for health claims 
concerning barley beta-fiber, the FDA appears to have made 
considerable effort to solicit relevant state input.156 A proposed rule 
approved claims that whole oat and whole grain barley products 
lowered the risk of coronary heart disease and stated that the rule, if 
adopted, would preempt state law claims regarding soluble fiber’s 
health claims to the extent that they were not identical to the federal 
regulation.157 Following the standard notice-and-comment period, the 
FDA reached out to states by faxing and emailing state health 
commissioners, food program directors, and drug program directors 
to “advise[] the States of FDA’s possible action and encourage[] the 
States and local government to review the petition and to provide any 
comments to the docket.”158 States were given one month to 
respond.159 After receiving no responses, the FDA once again invited 
state and local officials to comment on the interim rule.160 In response 
to its second call for comments, the FDA received a single, brief 
 
 154. Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, Expansion of the Nutrient Content Claim 
“Lean,” 72 Fed. Reg. at 1459; Food Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Dietary Fiber from 
Certain Foods and Heart Disease, 71 Fed. Reg. at 29,250. 
 155. E.g., Food Labeling: Nutrient Content Claims, Expansion of the Nutrient Content 
Claim “Lean,” 72 Fed. Reg. at 1456; Food Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Fiber from Certain 
Foods and Risk of Coronary Heart Disease, 73 Fed. Reg. 9938, 9946 (interim final rule Feb. 25, 
2008) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
 156. The barley rule is one of three instances mentioned by Mendelson in which agencies 
solicited comments from states. See Mendelson, supra note 46, at 719 n.127 (citing Food 
Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Dietary Fiber from Certain Foods and Coronary Heart 
Disease, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,248, 29,250 (May 22, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101)); id. at 719 
n.126 (citing Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Implementation in the 
Maritime Sector; Hazardous Materials Endorsement for a Commercial Drivers’ License, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 29,396 (proposed May 22, 2006)); id. at 719 n.127 (citing Taking of Marine Mammals 
Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations; Atlantic Large Whale Take Reduction Plan 
(ALWTRP), 71 Fed. Reg. 26,702, 26,704 (temporary rule May 8, 2006)). 
 157. Food Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Fiber from Certain Foods and Risk of Coronary 
Heart Disease, 72 Fed. Reg. 5367, 5373 (proposed Feb. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
101). 
 158. Food Labeling: Health Claims; Soluble Fiber from Certain Foods and Risk of Coronary 
Heart Disease, 73 Fed. Reg. at 9946 (Feb. 25, 2008). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
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comment from the Secretary of Health and Family Services of the 
State of Kentucky.161 
The FDA made similar efforts to prompt state response with a 
2007 proposed FDA rule regarding osteoporosis health claims for 
calcium and vitamin D combination milk products. Following the 
notice of proposed rulemaking, in which it asserted preemptive effect, 
the FDA “provided notice via fax and e-mail transmission to State 
health commissioners, State agriculture commissioners, food program 
directors, and drug program directors.”162 Having received no state 
response at the end of the comment period, the FDA invited states to 
comment on the proposed rule yet again.163 
It is difficult to know how to interpret the states’ seeming lack of 
interest to engage the relevant federal agency, in this case the FDA. 
The NCSL has raised concerns regarding the agency consultation 
process. For example, NCSL blamed the U.S. Department of 
Transportation for forgoing follow-up: “NCSL does not believe that 
one mailing constitutes meaningful consultation as contemplated by 
E.O. 13132. In sum, [the agency’s] attempts at meaningful 
consultation were feeble at best and disingenuous at worst.”164 
Instead, according to NCSL, 
it was incumbent on [the agency] to follow-up with public sector 
organizations by phone or e-mail to verify that the information was 
sent to the correct address and to establish a point of contact with 
our organization. . . . [The agency] did not conduct any follow-up 
contact with any of these organizations [(“Big Seven” members of 
state and local government coalitions)] and then construed our 
silence as some sort of acquiescence.165 
 
 161. The Secretary thanked the FDA for the opportunity to participate in the process and 
responded that “Kentucky conducts all labeling reviews in accordance with the [FDCA]; 
therefore, this ruling will not adversely affect our state’s actions or conflict with any state laws.” 
Letter from Janie Miller, Sec’y, Cabinet for Health and Family Servs., Ky., to Div. of Dockets 
Mgmt., FDA 1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/ 
main?main=DocketDetail&d=FDA-2008-N-0032. 
 162. Food Labeling: Health Claims; Calcium and Osteoporosis, and Calcium, Vitamin D, 
and Osteoporosis, 72 Fed. Reg. 497, 516 (proposed Jan. 5, 2007) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 
101). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Letter from Carl Tubbesing, Deputy Exec. Dir., Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, 
to William Schoonover, Docket Operations, U.S. Dep’t of Transp. (May 16, 2008) (on file with 
Duke Law Journal). 
 165. Id. 
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Some responsibility, however, lies with the state governmental 
groups who may have opted out of engaging with the federal 
agencies. Part of the disaffection or despair experienced by these 
groups may stem from their lack of faith that participation in the 
process can meaningfully shape the agency’s rulemaking. This 
dissatisfaction may stem from the nature of agencies’ responses to the 
comments they do provide. 
3. Response to Comments.  How do agencies respond, if at all, 
when state actors do submit comments? It appears that the agencies’ 
responses to questions and objections raised by stakeholder groups 
are often pro forma, which is perhaps not surprising given the general 
climate of nonengagement. 
Some narrow counterexamples give hope. In one situation, 
NAAG, on behalf of forty-six state attorneys general, sent a letter to 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services objecting to a proposed 
regulation that would have permitted drug manufacturers to purge 
certain records relating to a Medicaid rebate program after three 
years.166 The letter was submitted as part of the regulatory process167 
and, in this particular case, the intervention was successful—the 
regulation was withdrawn.168 
Groups such as NCSL, moreover, have the capacity to take 
further independent actions to conduct studies and to intervene in the 
agency rulemaking process. An example from a 2005 NHTSA 
proposed rule on roof crush resistance is instructive. Notwithstanding 
 
 166. A subsection of NAAG, the National Association of Medicaid Fraud Control Unit, 
sent out an alert that the proposed regulation had been published in the Federal Register. The 
state attorneys general were concerned that the regulation would undermine their ability to 
enforce the Medicaid program requirements; many state attorneys general have ongoing 
investigations concerning the rebate program and the three-year time window seemed unduly 
short. See Letter from Peter Heed, Att’y Gen. of N.H. et al. to Tommy G. Thompson, Sec’y, 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., et al. (Oct. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Heed Letter] (on file with 
Duke Law Journal) (raising concerns that a three-year recordkeeping requirement would be too 
short for the purposes of state law enforcement); see also Medicaid Program; Time Limitation 
on Recordkeeping Requirements Under the Drug Rebate Program, 69 Fed. Reg. 508, 511 
(interim final rule Jan. 6, 2004) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447) (recognizing concerns raised 
in NAAG letter and agreeing to change policy from a three-year requirement to a ten-year 
requirement). My research assistant, Benjamin Heidlage, deserves credit for bringing this 
example to my attention. 
 167. Heed Letter, supra note 166. 
 168. Medicaid Program; Time Limitation on Recordkeeping Requirements Under the Drug 
Rebate Program, 69 Fed. Reg. at 508 (“In this interim final rule with comment period we are 
removing the 3-year recordkeeping requirements, replacing them with 10-year recordkeeping 
requirements on a temporary basis, and soliciting comments on the 10-year requirements.”). 
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the fact that the rule stated that it “would preempt all conflicting 
State common law requirements, including rules of tort law,”169 
consistent with its pattern and practice of denial (detailed above in 
Part I.B), NHTSA disclaimed any federalism impact: “the proposal 
would not have any substantial impact on the States, or on the current 
Federal-State relationship.”170 NHTSA also bypassed any consultation 
with relevant state organizations on the ground that the proposed rule 
lacked “sufficient federal implications to warrant consultation with 
State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary 
impact statement.”171 NCSL contracted with the Pacific Institution for 
Research and Analysis to conduct an analysis of the financial impact 
of NHTSA’s proposed rule on the states. The study reported a 
projected increased annual financial burden of between $49 to $71 
million dollars, primarily due to increased state-paid medical and 
disability costs for rollover crash victims who could no longer recover 
from automobile manufacturers.172 Although NHTSA has not taken 
any official action to rescind the proposed rule, according to Susan 
Frederick, Federal Affairs Counsel for NCSL, it is “dead,” largely 
due to the empirical findings presented to the agency by NCSL.173 
Scant counterexamples do not a success story make. But they do, 
at a minimum, suggest that the process of federal agency engagement 
with governmental entities representing state regulatory interests 
does not have to remain as it is. That said, effective communication 
between the agency and the relevant state governmental bodies is a 
key prerequisite for success.174 And establishing such communication 
 
 169. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 70 Fed. Reg. 49,223, 
49,245 (proposed Aug. 23, 2005) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See TED R. MILLER & EDUARD ZALOSHNJA, PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND 
EVALUATION, STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS’ BENEFITS AND COSTS FROM 
NHTSA’S PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON ROOF CRUSH RESISTANCE 2 (2006) (“[T]he 
preemption of all conflicting State common law requirements, including rules of tort law, would 
prevent some permanently disabled victims in rollover crashes from recovering losses. As a 
result, the more seriously disabled could end up on Medicaid, which is partially funded by 
States.”). 
 173. Susan Frederick, Dir. of the Law & Justice Comm., Nat’l Conference of State 
Legislatures, Panelist Remarks at the New York University Annual Survey of American Law: 
Tort Law in the Shadow of Agency Preemption (Feb. 27, 2009). 
 174. During the Bush II administration, the pattern of nonconsultation coupled with the 
informal nature of the agency decisions, see supra note 30, made it extraordinarily difficult even 
for state groups that were in contact with an agency to keep abreast of preemption 
determinations. 
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and cooperation will be part and parcel of building a new agency-
state partnership. 
C. Partnership with the States 
Compliance with Executive Order 13,132’s strictures regarding 
the notice-and-comment process is a crucial first step, but far more 
important, and more difficult to implement, will be compliance with 
its broader spirit of agency-state interchange. How will it be possible 
to transform the existing relationship between states and federal 
agencies into a true partnership? 
One key to such a transformation entails ensuring a meaningful 
consultation process with impacted stakeholders.175 Consultation with 
the states must take place on a regular basis, even when the agency 
thinks that there is no federalism impact or obligation to issue an 
FIS.176 Moreover, the consultation must take place much earlier in the 
 
 175. This is part and parcel of the Executive Order’s direction that “no agency shall 
promulgate any regulation that has federalism implications and that preempts State law, unless 
the agency, prior to the formal promulgation of the regulation . . . consulted with State and local 
officials early in the process of developing the proposed regulation.” Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 
Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,258 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
  The EPA Guidelines elaborate: “Your consultation should be ‘meaningful and timely.’ 
Generally, we interpret ‘meaningful and timely’ to mean that consultation should begin as early 
as possible and continue as you develop the proposed rule.” EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS, GUIDANCE ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132: FEDERALISM, supra note 131, at 9. EPA’s 
Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations (OCIR) offers logistical support: 
“OCIR staff can help you assess issues of concern to other government entities, identify 
interested government officials, suggest ways for achieving their education and involvement, 
tailor information about rules for [state and local] government audiences, and develop and 
implement consultation plans.” Id. at 19. 
 176. Again, the EPA is exemplary. On several occasions, it has engaged in such consultation 
with the states. See, e.g., Water Quality Standards for Puerto Rico, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,517, 70,523 
(Dec. 12, 2007) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131) (“Although . . . Executive Order 13132 does 
not apply to this final rule, EPA did consult with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 
developing this rule. In the spirit of Executive Order 13132, and consistent with EPA policy to 
promote communications between EPA and State and local governments, EPA specifically 
solicited comment on the proposed rule from State and local officials.”); Component Durability 
Procedures for New Light-Duty Vehicles, Light-Duty Trucks and Heavy-Duty Vehicles, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 2843, 2852 (proposed Jan. 17, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 86) (“In the spirit of 
Executive Order 13132, and consistent with EPA policy to promote communications between 
EPA and State and local governments, EPA specifically solicits comment on this proposed rule 
from State and local officials.”); see also EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, GUIDANCE 
ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132: FEDERALISM, supra note 131, at 11 (“In the spirit of EO 13132, 
it is EPA’s policy to promote communications between EPA and [state and local] governments 
and solicit input from [state and local] government representatives when developing a 
regulation that will have any adverse impact above a minimal level on [state and local] 
governments. This internal policy is broader than EO 13132.”). 
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process.177 States must receive notice early on—well in advance of the 
agency’s imminent publication of a final rule—to have a hand in 
shaping the contours of a national rule. As a formal matter, such 
consultation is recognized by Executive Order 13,132, which urges 
agencies “[i]n determining whether to establish uniform national 
standards, [to] consult with appropriate State and local officials as to 
the need for national standards and any alternatives that would limit 
the scope of national standards or otherwise preserve State 
prerogatives and authority.”178 Moreover, agencies are to “consult 
with appropriate State and local officials to determine whether 
Federal objectives can be attained by other means.”179 For cases in 
which the need for national policy is recognized or required by 
federal statute, the agency is to “consult with the appropriate State 
and local officials in developing those standards.”180 Targeted 
outreach to states may be an effective way to gather state input on the 
optimal level of certain regulations and on the need for uniform 
national programs.181 
A case example from a NHTSA rulemaking shows that 
beneficial dialogue can occur when state officials and individuals 
representing state interests are involved in the rulemaking process at 
an earlier stage. NHTSA initiated a rulemaking process to determine 
whether to amend requirements for crash safety protection in small 
 
 177. Notice-and-comment rulemaking has been subject to a more generalized critique along 
these lines. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 145, at 12 (“[T]he notice and comment process often 
fails to make the best use of available data and information. This is in part a product of timing: 
only after the Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) do parties supply detailed arguments 
about the technical and practical difficulties of implementing a rule, instead of much earlier 
when the information might be more valuable to the agency in formulating the proposed rule.”). 
 178. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,256. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. One idea, suggested to me by Phil Weiser, would be for each federal agency to have 
some type of ombudsperson committed to state outreach. Executive Order 13,132 in fact 
requires agencies to designate a “federalism official,” who is charged with certifying compliance 
with the order. See infra note 206 and accompanying text; see also EPA’S ACTION 
DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, GUIDANCE ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132: FEDERALISM, supra note 
131, at 19 n.7 (highlighting the role of the “Regulatory Steering Committee Representative” of 
EPA’s Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Relations in assisting with outreach to 
EPA’s intergovernmental partners). 
  Another idea, suggested by my student Christopher Terranova, is for each agency to 
create a working group of interested parties with which it can consult. See Christopher 
Terranova, Challenging Agency Preemption 19–20 (May 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with Duke Law Journal). The Federal Railroad Administration regularly consulted with 
such a working group before issuing its preemptive rules. See id. (manuscript at 9–10). 
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and large school buses. Early in the process, prior to the issuance of 
the notice of proposed rulemaking, NHTSA convened a “roundtable 
of State and local government policymakers, school bus and seat 
manufacturers, pupil transportation associations and consumer 
associations to address . . . [s]tate and local policy perspectives” on 
the feasibility and desirability of a national uniform requirement.182 
Participants at the roundtable included representatives from states 
with compulsory seatbelt requirements, individuals with expertise in 
seatbelt installation (and the effects on passenger capacity), and a 
representative from the National School Transportation 
Association.183 A consensus emerged that the costs of installing belts 
would outweigh the benefits.184 
This situation was unique because the invitation to participate 
was extended to several representative local and state interest groups 
when the rule was at a preliminary proposal stage; this was not a 
perfunctory request for comment once much of the shape of the rule 
was already determined. Such early-stage participation shapes the 
outcome of the rule and affords the states an opportunity to 
participate in the federalism debate. 
IV. “AGENCY-FORCING” MEASURES 
Policy groups and academics interested in protecting state 
regulatory interests from an onslaught of national expansion should 
engage in the discussion of how agency policymaking can be 
structured to be more responsive to federalism concerns.185 Although 
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the agencies,186 which, as detailed above in Part I, are thus prone to 
ignore it. Such agency-forcing measures admittedly face formidable 
barriers, but they have enormous, hitherto untapped, potential to 
transform agencies into loci for rich, deliberative dialogue regarding 
the interplay of state law and federal regulatory schemes. 
A variety of institutional actors could take the lead. First, 
Congress could codify the strictures of the Executive Order. Second, 
the White House could use its Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs’ (OIRA) centralized review to enforce the Executive Order. 
Each of these avenues has been proposed before in this (or similar) 
context—thus far, to no avail—and while they may be worth 
revisiting, my main focus will be on the comparatively underexplored 
realm of judicial enforcement. 
The innovative proposal is to think about how courts might force 
agencies into action. Although it is oft-repeated that courts can do 
little to spur agency action,187 judicial enforcement holds the greatest 
promise. Admittedly, one searches in vain for traces of direct 
challenges to preemptive rules in the health and safety arena. The 
status quo may be explained either by deliberate strategic choices or 
by standing and ripeness barriers. Regardless of whether direct 
challenges can get off the ground, courts can play an effective agency-
forcing role at a later juncture, when called upon to rule on the 
assertion of preemption—typically in a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment—as a defense to a state products liability claim. 
The United States Supreme Court implicitly gave its imprimatur to 
such an “indirect challenge” to agency rulemaking in Wyeth v. 
Levine.188 In rejecting a drug manufacturer’s assertion of implied 
preemption of state failure-to-warn claims, the Court looked askance 
at the FDA’s “proclamations of pre-emption” in its 2006 preemption 
 
 186. Exec. Order No. 13,132, § 11, 64 Fed. Reg. at 43,259 (stating that the Executive Order 
“is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch, and is not 
intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party 
against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person”). 
 187. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory 
State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1276 (2006) (“[C]ourts generally cannot spur agency action.”). 
Agency inaction is notoriously difficult to police. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), 
established that an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily subject 
to judicial review. Id. at 831. Agencies, moreover, enjoy a wide berth of discretion “to choose 
how best to marshal [their] limited resources and personnel to carry out [their] delegated 
responsibilities.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 (1984)). 
 188. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
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preamble.189 The Court specifically mentioned that the FDA’s failure 
to “offer[] States or other interested parties notice or opportunity for 
comment” rendered its views on state law “inherently suspect.”190 
One effect of Wyeth will be to encourage agencies to shepherd 
preemption provisions through notice and comment—thus expanding 
the domain for direct challenges to such provisions through the APA 
framework. Even more significantly, Wyeth could augur the dawn of a 
new form of indirect challenge, arising when the preemption defense 
is raised to state tort causes of action, with far-reaching implications. 
A. Congressional 
Congress should codify Executive Order 13,132 to require 
agencies to consult with public officials and prepare federalism 
impact statements for all rules that impact federalism.191 The bills 
proposed thus far have failed, but this may have had something to do 
with their arguably overbroad nature; the proposed bills tried to 
impose accountability requirements on Congress as well as on federal 
agencies.192 
The Federalism Accountability Act of 1999 (1999 FAA) 
(introduced in the 106th Congress) required federal agencies to 
consult with potentially affected state and local governments and to 
prepare “federalism assessments” explaining the reason for any 
 
 189. Id. at 1201. For a description of the 2006 preamble, see supra Part I.A.1. 
 190. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201. 
 191. There is surprisingly little academic commentary addressing the merits of congressional 
codification of Executive Order 13,132 (or its precursors). For at least a mention, see Nina A. 
Mendelson, The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision and Agency Interpretation: A 
Response to Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, 57 DUKE L.J. 2157, 2172 (2008). Professor 
Mendelson noted the unenforceability of Executive Order 13,132 and stated that 
“[c]ongressional action is clearly required here.” Id. For a more pessimistic assessment, see 
Patricia L. Donze, Legislating Comity: Can Congress Enforce Federalism Constraints Through 
Restrictions on Preemption Doctrine?, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 239, 275 (2000–01). As 
Ms. Donze notes, “Almost every single phrase of the proposed bills would conceivably spur 
litigation, and there is no assurance that the bills would do anything more than require 
boilerplate federalism assessments by agencies . . . already under stress due to scarce time and 
resources.” Id. 
 192. Moreover, they have included more than simply a codification of Executive Order 
13,132. For example, the proposed bill from the 106th Congress included a “rule of construction 
relating to preemption” for use by federal, state, and local court judges that tipped the balance 
decidedly against preemption—in essence codifying the presumption against preemption. 
S. 1214, 106th Cong. §§ 4, 6 (1999). But see Federalism Preservation Act of 1999, H.R. 2960, 
106th Cong. §2(a) (codifying the terms of Executive Order 12,612). 
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preemptive determination.193 In addition, the FAA would have 
required each congressional committee report to state explicitly 
whether the bill preempted state law and, if so, the reasons that such 
preemption was necessary.194 
The politics of enactment are complicated. The proposed 1999 
FAA initially received broad support in the Senate; the bill was 
positively recommended by the Committee on Governmental Affairs 
by a bipartisan 8 to 2 vote.195 The bill nonetheless failed to make it to 
the Senate floor (companion bills in the House met a similar fate196), 
 
 193. S. 1214, 106th Cong. § 7 (1999). These provisions codified President Ronald Reagan’s 
Executive Order 12,612, Executive Order 13,132’s predecessor. Executive Order 12,612 (similar 
to E.O. 13,132) listed federalism principles for agencies to follow and required a designated 
federalism official to complete a “federalism assessment.” 
  President Clinton’s proposed 1998 Executive Order 13,083 (to replace the Reagan 
order), “which was viewed as a significant retreat from previous executive orders regarding 
federal preemption,” gave additional momentum to backers of the bills. John Dinan, 
Strengthening the Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Fate of Recent Federalism Legislation 
in the U.S. Congress, 34 PUBLIUS 55, 64 (2004). President Clinton suspended his order after a 
“firestorm of criticism”—including charges that, ironically, he failed to consult with state 
groups. Id. But “state and local officials were by this point convinced” that they could no longer 
rely on executive orders and needed statutory protection. Id.; see also David S. Broder, 
Executive Order Urged Consulting, but Didn’t; State, Local Officials Want Federalism Say, 
WASH. POST, July 16, 1998, at A15. 
  One day after the FAA cleared a Senate committee, President Clinton issued 
Executive Order 13,132, perhaps to quell the momentum from the bill’s supporters. See Donze, 
supra note 191, at 269–70 n.176; see also Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Summary of 
Executive Order 13132 on Federalism Issued by Clinton Administration, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
statefed/federalism/exec13132.htm (last visited May 13, 2009) (describing “extensive 
negotiations between the White House and seven national organizations . . . representing state 
and local government officials”). 
 194. S. 1214, 106th Cong. § 5. 
 195. S. REP. NO. 106-159, at 13 (1999). Among the original ten sponsors of the bill, five were 
Democrats (Bayh (Ind.), Robb (Va.), Breaux (La.), Levin (Mich.), and Lincoln (Ark.)). S. 1214, 
106th Cong. The two dissenters in the Committee, however, were both Democrats—Senators 
Durbin (Ill.) and Cleland (Ga.). S. REP. NO. 106-159, at 13.  
  The House bills, meanwhile, had a much stronger Republican tilt in terms of 
sponsorship. The Federalism Act, which closely tracked the 1999 FAA (S. 1214)—both included 
a rule of statutory construction against preemption, a requirement that agencies promulgate a 
federalism impact statement accompanying proposed rules, and requirements for Congress to 
state explicitly the preemptive consequences of bills in committee reports—ended up with thirty 
Republican sponsors and five Democratic sponsors (Condit (Cal.), Moran (Va.), McCarthy 
(Mo.), Danner (Mo.), and Shows (Miss.)). H.R. 2245, 106th Cong. (1999). 
  The Federalism Preservation Act of 1999, which simply required all federal 
departments and agencies to comply with Executive Order 12,612, had twenty-four 
cosponsors—all Republicans. The chief sponsor of that bill was Bob Barr (Ga.). H.R. 2960, 
106th Cong. (1999). 
 196. Neither of the House bill counterparts, H.R. 2245 and H.R. 2960, made it out of 
Committee. 
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and it has never been reintroduced. Strange bedfellows—the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce joined by proregulatory environmental, 
labor, and consumer organizations—opposed the bill. The Chamber 
of Commerce “waged a major campaign to kill or substantially 
weaken the measures,” fearing that the bill would thwart the 
imposition of national standards.197 At the same time, a group of 300 
environmental, labor, consumer, and other groups opposed the 
legislation for fear that it could impede federal action.198 Donna 
Shalala, then-director of Health and Human Services, voiced a similar 
concern that the Act could weaken consumer protection programs, 
which depend on national uniform rules to be effective, and that 
burdensome procedural requirements for agencies would increase 
cost and cause delay.199 
During 2007 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on regulatory 
preemption, Donna Stone, representing the NCSL, proposed an 
updated version, the Federalism Accountability Act of 2007 (2007 
FAA).200 The legislation, which largely replicates the failed 1999 Act, 
would require an agency to conduct notice and comment as to the 
preemptive effect of a rule.201 A key provision of the proposed bill 
specifically authorizes judicial enforcement: should an agency fail to 
perform a federalism impact statement, “a court may . . . delay the 
effective date of such rule until the federalism assessment and 
consultation are completed.”202 
The success of congressional mandates for agency-state 
cooperation in the REAL ID experience,203 as well as in the realm of 
environmental law,204 provides some modicum of hope that, assuming 
the political hurdles could be overcome, codification of the Executive 
Order would pave the way toward more fruitful agency-state 
cooperation and interaction in setting regulatory policy. 
 
 197. Stephen Labaton, Anti-Federalism Measures Have Bipartisan Support, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 6, 1999, at A12. 
 198. Id.; see also Dinan, supra note 193, at 66 (“[H]ealth, labor, and environmental 
groups . . . strongly opposed [the federalism bills] on the ground that they would prevent the 
enactment of numerous beneficial statutes and regulations.”). 
 199. S. REP. NO. 106-159, at 27. 
 200. Sen. Hearing on Regulatory Preemption, supra note 21, at 7–8. 
 201. Telephone Interview with Susan Frederick, supra note 133. Ms. Frederick kindly 
provided a copy of the proposed draft bill, which was never introduced into Congress. Draft Bill 
(on file with the Duke Law Journal). The notice-and-comment provision is in section 7. 
 202. Draft Bill § 6(f)(4) (“Court Action”). 
 203. See supra notes 95–105 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text. 
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B. Executive 
Another tack would be for the executive to take the lead, 
directing OIRA (housed within the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB)) to conduct centralized review of agency compliance 
with Executive Order 13,132.205 
For certain regulations—those subject to OMB review under the 
cost-benefit executive order (Executive Order 12,866)—the 
federalism executive order requires a designated federalism official in 
each agency to certify that the order’s requirements “have been met 
in a meaningful and timely manner” in developing regulations with 
federalism implications.206 Two limitations surface at the outset. First, 
the required certification to OMB is required only for “significant” 
regulations (defined as having an annual effect on the economy of at 
least $100 million) subject to Executive Order 12,866.207 Second, OMB 
is given little to review; it is asked simply for a vote of confidence in 
the federalism officer’s conclusion. In theory, OMB could review the 
federalism impact statements required for all rulemakings with 
“federalism implications.”208 But, such theoretical review provides 
 
 205. In 2009, the Director of the OMB set out to “develop[] a set of recommendations to the 
President for a new Executive Order on Federal Regulatory Review” and, as part of the 
process, invited “public comments on how to improve the process and principles governing 
regulation.” 74 Fed. Reg. 8819 (Feb. 26, 2009). The preexisting guidelines on implementation of 
Executive Order 13,132 are procedural in nature, focusing on “what agencies should do to 
comply with [the Order] and how they should document that compliance to OMB.” 
Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies, and Independent Regulatory Agencies, Guidance for 
Implementing E.O. 13132, “Federalism” (Oct. 28, 1999), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/omb/memoranda/m00-02.pdf. 
 206. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,258–59 (Aug. 4, 1999). 
 207. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993), amended by Exec. Order 
No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007); see also Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 
43,255, 43,258 (Aug. 4, 1999) (providing for certification of compliance to OMB when 
“transmitting any draft final regulation that has federalism implications to [OMB] pursuant to 
Executive Order 12866”). Executive Order 12,866 defines a “significant regulatory action” in 
terms of an “annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.” Exec. Order No. 12,866, 
§ 3(f), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735; id. at § 6(a)(3)(A), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (“[Regulations] not 
designated as significant will not be subject to [OMB] review.”). According to an empirical 
study by Steven Croley, only 5 percent of federal rules met this standard for OMB review 
during the period 1981–2000. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An 
Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 846 (2003). 
  The EPA’s federalism guidelines propose a lower dollar figure ($25 million) for 
establishing reviewability under Executive Order 13,132. See EPA’S ACTION DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS, GUIDANCE ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 13132: FEDERALISM, supra note 131, at 6. 
 208. See supra note 147. 
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cold comfort in the face of a reality in which agencies evade the 
requirement to produce FISs. 
OIRA’s centralized review of agencies’ compliance with cost-
benefit analysis pursuant to Executive Order 12,866 provides a 
potential template.209 Agencies, moreover, have guidelines for how to 
conduct cost-benefit analyses.210 Similar guidelines should be 
developed for federalism impact statements. 
OIRA enforcement cannot escape politics.211 For this reason, 
judicial review will remain an important policing mechanism. 
C. Judicial 
Courts review administrative agency rulemaking under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. In the realm of health and safety, 
however, direct challenges to agency action (or inaction) have been 
few and far between. The time has come for a broader set of “agency-
forcing” measures. 
Outside of the APA framework of direct challenges to agency 
rulemaking, courts can play an “agency-forcing” role in the context of 
adjudicating whether federal law preempts state common law actions. 
The idea that preemption controversies before state and federal 
courts provide such an opportunity for an indirect challenge to agency 
 
 209. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, INST. FOR POLICY 
INTEGRITY, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW, FIXING REGULATORY REVIEW: RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION 4–5 (2008) [hereinafter REVESZ & LIVERMORE, 
RECOMMENDATIONS]; see also RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING 
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
AND OUR HEALTH 31–32 (2008) (stating that the message of Executive Order 12,866 was that 
“centralized review and cost-benefit analysis could serve as a neutral tool”); Bagley & Revesz, 
supra note 187, at 1267 (“In recent years, the functional appropriateness of Executive Order 
12,866 as a template for executive control of the administrative process has not been seriously 
challenged.”). 
 210. See OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, CIRCULAR A-4 ON REGULATORY 
ANALYSIS (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a004/a-4.pdf. 
 211. REVESZ & LIVERMORE, RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 209, at 7 (“The history of 
federal regulatory review has shown that OIRA’s role easily shifts to reflect changing 
administrative ideologies: starting as a secretive and blunt instrument under President Reagan, 
changing to more of a facilitator under President Clinton, and reverting to a regulatory 
gatekeeper under President George W. Bush.”); id. at 9 (“A 2003 study by the U.S. General 
Accounting Office (now called the Government Accountability Office) found that, over the last 
eight years, OIRA has acted more as a gatekeeper—aggressively imposing its will at the 
expense of reasoned analysis and science—whereas during the Clinton Administration it played 
the role of a facilitator.”). Revesz and Livermore’s recommendations are “geared towards 
making durable changes in OIRA’s roles so that it can become a stabilizing force in regulatory 
review, rather than merely a mirror of the latest and mercurial administrative agenda.” Id. at 7. 
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rulemaking may seem counterintuitive. But it makes sense once one 
recognizes the centrality of the agency’s input to courts’ preemption 
decisions—particularly with respect to how state law affects the 
federal regulatory scheme. Even the Court’s antipreemption decision 
in Wyeth v. Levine (in which the FDA’s preemption preamble 
received especially harsh treatment) recognized the significance of 
input from the relevant federal agency.212 
Wyeth stands as an intriguing exemplar of how courts can play an 
agency-forcing role. Bent on reconciling its implied preemption 
holdings, the Court contrasted its propreemption Geier decision, in 
which the Department of Transportation had promulgated a 
regulation with “force of law,”213 with the situation in Wyeth, in which 
the FDA had put forth its views in a preamble that evaded the notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures.214 Justice Stephen Breyer 
concurred separately to emphasize the majority’s concession that 
agency regulations with “force of law” can preempt.215 Justice Breyer 
spelled out that the FDA “may seek to embody [its] determinations 
[whether and when state tort law acts as a help or hindrance to 
federal regulatory goals] in lawful specific regulations describing, for 
example, when labeling requirements serve as a ceiling as well as a 
floor.”216 
In the wake of Wyeth, agencies have an incentive to put 
preemption provisions through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
 
 212. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009) (Agencies have “a unique understanding 
of the statutes they administer and an attendant ability to make informed determinations about 
how state requirements may pose an ‘obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))); 
id. (“[W]e have attended to an agency’s explanation of how state law affects the regulatory 
scheme.”). To be sure, the Court emphasized that preemption is a judicial decision that is 
informed by agency input. Id. at 1203 (“After conducting our own pre-emption analysis [in 
Geier], we considered the agency’s explanation of how state law interfered with its regulation, 
regarding it as further support for our independent conclusion that the plaintiff’s tort claim 
obstructed the federal regime.”). 
 213. Id. at 1200. 
 214. Id. at 1203 (“By contrast, we have no occasion in this case to consider the pre-emptive 
effect of a specific agency regulation bearing the force of law.”). 
 215. Id. at 1200 (“This Court has recognized that an agency regulation with the force of law 
can pre-empt conflicting state requirements.” (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 
861 (2000)); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985))). 
Even in such situations, “the Court has performed its own conflict determination, relying on the 
substance of state and federal law and not on agency proclamations of pre-emption.” Id. at 
1200–01. 
 216. Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[I]t is possible that such determinations would 
have pre-emptive effect.”). 
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Such direct regulations would be more likely to pass judicial muster at 
the preemption juncture, but they would also be more susceptible to 
direct challenges during the rulemaking process.217 
But the reach of Wyeth goes even further—into contexts where 
either Congress has not authorized the agency to preempt state law 
directly,218 or the agency has not promulgated regulations with “force 
of law.” In these situations, the Court still looks to the agency’s 
explanation of how state law affects the regulatory regime. The 
question becomes “what weight [the Court] should accord the FDA’s 
opinion.”219 The Court had previously given a nod (if not outright 
deference) to agency proclamations of preemption in “regulations, 
preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to comments.”220 
My own view has been that the agency’s views should be accorded 
Skidmore “power to persuade” (not Chevron mandatory) 
deference221—a position apparently endorsed by the Court in Wyeth.222 
By virtue of subjecting agency action and interpretation to Skidmore 
deference at the preemption juncture, courts establish a framework 
for indirect challenges to agency rulemaking. 
 
 217. See infra text accompanying note 232. 
 218. See, e.g., Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (comparing Wyeth with 21 U.S.C. § 360k, which 
“authoriz[es] the FDA to determine the scope of the [Medical Device Amendment’s] pre-
emption clause”). In this respect, Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld have, in my view, 
interpreted Wyeth too broadly by suggesting that it holds that Congress must clearly delegate 
the power to preempt before an agency can exercise that power. See Brian Galle & Mark 
Seidenfeld, Preemption and Federal Administrative Law, 34 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS (2009) 
(abstract). 
 219. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201. 
 220. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 505–06 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 495–
96 (majority opinion) (“The FDA regulations interpreting the scope of [the statute’s] pre-
emptive effect support the [antipreemption] view, and our interpretation of the preemption 
statute is substantially informed by those regulations.” (emphasis added)); see also Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000) (“We place some weight upon DOT’s 
interpretation of [the regulation’s] objectives and its conclusion, as set forth in the 
Government’s brief, that a tort suit such as this one would stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of those objectives.”). 
  In these cases, the Court studiously avoided specifying the level of deference owed 
agency interpretations on preemption. Several lower courts gave Chevron, or mandatory, 
deference to the FDA’s preemption preamble. See, e.g., Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, 
supra note 6, at 512 n.304 (citing cases). 
 221. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 491–98. 
 222. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201 (“The weight we accord the agency’s explanation of state 
law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and 
persuasiveness.”) (comparing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001) and 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
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1. Direct Challenges to Agency Rulemaking.  Courts already have 
tools to ensure that agencies disclose relevant data and provide 
reasoned responses to material objections raised during the 
rulemaking process. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.223 articulates a standard of “hard 
look” review in the context of determining whether a regulation is 
“arbitrary and capricious” under § 706 of the APA.224 State Farm 
solidifies previously articulated agency standards imposed by lower 
courts (under § 553 of the APA), such as the United States v. Nova 
Scotia Food Products Corp.225 obligation to respond to significant 
comments during the notice-and-comment period:226 
It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, 
raised by comments which are of cogent materiality, completely 
unanswered. The agencies certainly have a good deal of discretion in 
expressing the basis of a rule, but the agencies do not have quite the 
prerogative of obscurantism reserved to legislatures.227  
Direct challenges to preemptive rules in the health and safety 
arena are, however, few and far between. This is in marked contrast 
to other areas, such as environmental regulation, where nonprofit and 
governmental organizations take an active role in challenging rules 
adverse to state regulatory interests.228 What explains this seeming 
market failure? 
First, as a threshold matter (explored above in Part III.A), it is 
not altogether clear who most effectively represents the state 
regulatory interests in the health and safety context. It is a bit of a 
puzzle why groups such as NCSL and NAAG have not asserted state 
 
 223. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
 224. Id. at 34. 
 225. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 226. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–44. 
 227. Nova Scotia, 568 F.2d at 252. An agency is not expected to respond to each and every 
comment. See, e.g., MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“An 
agency is not obliged to respond to every comment, only those that can be thought to challenge 
a fundamental premise.”). 
 228. See, e.g., Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman of Comm. on Oversight & Gov. 
Reform, to Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator of EPA 3 (Oct. 21, 2008), available at 
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081021110039.pdf (reporting that during the Bush II 
Administration, the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an EPA regulation in 18 
of 27 Clean Air Act cases); Chris Bowman, Bush Team Battered by Courts on Environment, 
SAC. BEE, May 19, 2008, at A1 (“[T]he Bush administration won just one” case out of “78 
federal court rulings and settlements in [Endangered Species Act] cases resolved since January 
2001”). 
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regulatory interests as strongly in this area as in others. After all, 
courts have deferred to informal agency proclamations of 
preemption, such as that embodied in the preemption preamble.229 
Cognizant of these developments, which could lead to foreclosing 
state tort suits down the road, state governmental entities and public 
interest groups would have an incentive to challenge procedural 
failures in the rulemaking process. But such direct agency challenges 
have not materialized. Why not? 
Perhaps only a direct, sizeable financial stake will be sufficient to 
galvanize state participation.230 Moreover, some state governmental 
entities (representing both state courts and legislatures) may have 
succumbed to the “tort reform” spirit, which has led to a variety of 
substantive and procedural measures to cabin tort liability and limit 
the remedies afforded to injured victims.231 
Second, agencies’ insertion of preemptive provisions into 
preambles to rules may provide part of the answer. Such stealth 
maneuvers simultaneously diverted the attention of the watchdogs 
and also may have insulated the rules from direct judicial challenge.232 
As a strategic matter, moreover, consumer advocates may have 
consciously avoided any invitation to the courts to find that an agency 
 
 229. See supra note 220. 
 230. Consider in this regard the vociferous outcry by the states regarding the REAL ID Act. 
See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 231. Certain state legislative tort reform measures—such as caps on punitive and 
noneconomic damages—have made strong inroads. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Catherine M. 
Sharkey, What Drives the Passage of Damage Caps?, in EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF JUDICIAL 
SYSTEMS AROUND THE GLOBE (forthcoming 2009) (“A number of states have passed caps on 
non-economic and punitive damage awards in civil cases.”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended 
Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 396 (2005) (“A 
majority of states have imposed some kind of cap or limitation on the amount of damages that 
plaintiffs can recover in a lawsuit.”). By contrast, however, tort reform efforts to establish 
regulatory compliance as an absolute defense to state tort claims have been an abject failure. 
See Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical 
Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 1013, 1022–23 (2007) (“It is hardly an 
exaggeration to claim that the push for a strong regulatory compliance defense to tort 
liability . . . advocated by a host of scholars and policymakers has been an abject failure. Today, 
Michigan stands alone in having adopted, by statute, blanket immunity based upon federal 
regulatory compliance.” (footnote omitted)). 
 232. The United States has taken the position that “[n]either the Administrative Procedure 
Act nor Executive Order 13,132 requires FDA to provide notice of and an opportunity to 
comment on responses to public comments about a proposed rule, setting forth the agency’s 
view of principles of implied conflict preemption in a preamble that is not part of the codified 
final rule.” Brief for Amicus Curiae the United States of America at 19 n.8, Colacicco v. 
Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (Civ. No. 05-CV-05500-MMB), 2006 WL 
1724170. 
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did have authority to issue the preemption statement or, even worse, 
that the agency statement was correct or warranted deference. 
Instead, such advocates may have focused exclusively on injured 
consumers seeking to litigate their tort suits afterward. 
Finally, standing and ripeness problems loom large. The Food 
Drug and Cosmetic Act does not create a private right of action for 
individuals to challenge FDA decisions or to enforce on behalf of the 
FDA.233 Who would be the appropriate party to challenge a 
preemption preamble via the Administrative Procedure Act, in 
advance of federal enforcement based upon deference to the agency’s 
interpretation contained therein? And at what juncture would a 
dispute be of sufficient immediacy to be ripe for judicial 
consideration? There is no brightline doctrinal rule here nor any 
categorical bar to judicial review of preambles.234 The Court of 
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, for example, will entertain direct 
challenges to preambles of final regulations, albeit in the limited 
context in which the preamble has “independent legal effect, which in 
turn is a function of the agency’s intention to bind either itself or 
regulated parties.”235 But even so, the challenging party would have to 
demonstrate a “direct and immediate” effect—a formidable standard 
to meet.236 
Given these stumbling blocks, it is usually not until defendants 
wield these rules in the context of asserting preemption defenses 
against state common law products claims that the clash of state and 
federal regulatory interests comes to a head. It is, nonetheless, worth 
 
 233. 21 U.S.C. § 337 (2006); see also In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 193 
F.3d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1999) (“It is well settled . . . that the FDCA creates no private right of 
action). 
 234. For an insightful discussion of these standing and ripeness challenges, see Terranova, 
supra note 181 (manuscript at 28–30). My discussion in this paragraph borrows from 
Terranova’s discussion. 
 235. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 
1996). A preamble that was “an interpretation of an identified statutory provision, [or] a 
clarification of an otherwise binding regulation,” would likely pass this test. Id.; see also NRDC 
v. EPA, 559 F.3d 561, 564–65 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“While preamble statements may in some 
unique cases constitute binding, final agency action susceptible to judicial review, this is not the 
norm. Agency statements ‘having general applicability and legal effect’ are to be published in 
the Code of Federal Regulations.” (quoting Federal Register Act, 44 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (citation 
omitted))). 
 236. In Kennecott, for example, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the challenge on ripeness 
grounds, concluding that “[u]nless and until [the Department of the] Interior or another trustee 
invokes the preamble in an attempt to affect the outcome of a real dispute, there is little need 
for and no factual basis to inform our inquiry into its validity.” Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1223. 
SHARKEY IN FINAL 6/24/2009  8:54:12 AM 
2184 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:2125 
contemplating whether legal developments might bolster the 
effectiveness of direct rulemaking challenges. 
In Massachusetts v. EPA,237 the U.S. Supreme Court bestowed 
“special solicitude” upon the state in its analysis of standing in the 
context of a challenge to an EPA order denying a petition for 
rulemaking to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles 
under the Clean Air Act.238 The Court reaffirmed that “[w]hen a 
litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has standing if 
there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt the 
injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed 
the litigant.”239 Even as scholars debate the precise contours of special 
solicitude for states,240 courts might accord similar latitude for 
standing to challenge the rulemaking procedures of some group 
deputized to represent state regulatory interests.241 
Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule, moreover, heralded 
Massachusetts v. EPA as “State Farm for a new generation.”242 At a 
minimum, the Court’s prior claim that agencies receive heightened 
deference even when they have refused to initiate rulemaking 
proceedings has been called into question. It remains to be seen the 
extent to which courts will reinvigorate and expand “hard look” 
review of agency action. Wyeth v. Levine could expand the domain of 
direct challenges to preemption provisions in notice-and-comment 
rulemakings should agencies be spurred in that direction. It also 
stands as a progenitor of a new form of indirect challenge, arising 
 
 237. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 238. Id. at 520. 
 239. Id. at 518. 
 240. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 118, at 2062–63 (“[W]hat the majority intends by its 
invocation of ‘special solicitude’ for the states in standing analysis is not obvious; such solicitude 
might mean a generous stance in determining whether the traditional trio of requirements for 
standing is met, or exempting the states from the traditional analysis altogether when their 
sovereignty interests are implicated.”). 
 241. Dru Stevenson links the Court’s standing innovation with the evolving role of state 
attorneys general. See Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 38 (2007) (“Standing is one additional obstacle that every AG 
must consider before commencing an action. Relaxing the standing requirements for states 
means that there will be one less hurdle—a significant hurdle that itself could otherwise 
consume costly litigation resources—for policy-oriented litigation by the state AG’s. Now that 
the costs are lower and the chances of success are greater, proceeding to litigation will be a 
rational decision for AG’s more frequently.” (footnote omitted)). 
 242. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52. 
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when the preemption defense is raised against state tort causes of 
action. 
2. Indirect Challenges to Agency Rulemaking.  The extent to 
which courts can play an agency-forcing role at a later juncture—
namely in the context of a preemption defense to a state products 
liability claim raised in court—has been relatively unexplored. 
I have suggested that courts could play a role here by 
conditioning any deference to an agency’s preemption position on 
that agency’s compliance with the strictures of Executive Order 
13,132.243 A few federal district courts have taken such a hard-line 
position, rejecting preemption defenses based upon the FDA’s 
assertion of preemption in the drug labeling context.244 I have also 
urged Skidmore “power to persuade” deference (as opposed to 
mandatory Chevron deference) as a means to “encourag[e] agencies 
to engage in formal notice-and-comment rulemaking processes that, 
arguably, vet the agency decisionmaking process and make the 
agency respond to substantive concerns raised by all affected 
parties.”245 
I now want to extend that view and suggest that preemption 
decisions might provide an apt avenue for a new form of indirect 
challenge to agency rulemaking and regulatory actions with wider 
applicability. What I have in mind is an extension of the Nova Scotia-
 
 243. See Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 11, at 256–57. 
 244. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Wyeth, No. 2:07-cv-82, 2008 WL 5272715, at *10 (D. Vt. Dec. 10, 
2008) (finding that procedural defects indicate that the FDA’s position was not “promulgated in 
the exercise of [agency] authority” (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006))); In 
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 275 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The FDA cannot be 
allowed to usher in such a sweeping change in substantive law through the back door.”); 
Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 & n.3 (D. Neb. 2006) (“The FDA failed to 
comply with its requirements [under Executive Order 13,132] to communicate with the states 
and to allow the states an opportunity to participate in the proceedings prior to a preemption 
decision.”); McNellis ex rel. DeAngelis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286 (JBS), 2006 WL 2819046, 
at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006) (“[T]he 2006 [FDA Drug Labeling] Preamble was a novation, not 
subjected to prior public notice or comment . . . .”), rev’d sub nom. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 
521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (mem.). 
But see Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, 484 F. Supp. 2d 289, 315 n.27 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (rejecting the 
court’s reasoning in Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc.); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & 
Prod. Liab. Litig., No. M: 05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) 
(“[T]he FDA’s failure to comply with Executive Order 13132 regarding consultation with local 
officials about a possible conflict with state law does not mean that this Court cannot consider 
the FDA’s view of how certain state laws stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
objectives of Federal law.”). 
 245. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 498. 
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State Farm framework of hard look review in the context of court 
preemption decisions.246 Courts are well poised to police agencies’ 
flouting of their responsibilities in the domains of regulatory review 
and interpretation. 
Wyeth v. Levine implicitly endorses the “agency reference 
model” with the corresponding heightened judicial scrutiny that I 
have propounded. What is perhaps most striking about the decision is 
the fact that the majority and dissent embrace at least one dimension 
of the agency reference model: namely an examination of the 
contemporaneous agency record to determine precisely the risks 
weighed by the FDA.247 Implied preemption rests on the critical 
significance of agency attention to the question of dangers posed by 
the particular administration of the drug at issue in Wyeth.248 
 
 246. But see Mendelson, supra note 191, at 2164 n.42 (suggesting that the Nova Scotia 
“obligation to respond to ‘significant comments’ that courts have imposed as a gloss on Section 
553 of the APA” would not seem to extend outside of the rulemaking context proper). 
 247. The majority relies upon the trial court’s finding that “the agency had paid no more 
than passing attention to the question whether to warn against IV-push administration of 
Phenergan.” Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009); see also id. at 1199 (“[T]he trial court 
found ‘no evidence in this record that either the FDA or the manufacturer gave more than 
passing attention to the issue of’ IV-push versus IV-drip administration.” (quoting the 
appendix)). The majority in no way distances itself from similar agency reliance in Geier, 
indeed, the majority contrasts the situation in Wyeth with that in Geier, where the 
“contemporaneous record . . . revealed the factors the agency had weighed and the balance it 
had struck.” Id. at 1203. 
  The dissent responds that “[t]he FDA has long known about the risks associated with 
IV push in general and its use to administer Phenergan in particular.” Id. at 1218 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). The majority, however, accuses the dissent of creative parsing and reconstruction of 
the record to “suggest greater agency attention to the question” Id. at 1199 n.6 (majority 
opinion). 
  The majority concedes that the agency record is incomplete, commenting upon the 
“sparse correspondence between Wyeth and the FDA about Phenergan’s labeling,” id. at 1192, 
and the “limited” record regarding any newly acquired information in Wyeth’s hands, id. at 1197 
(“The record is limited concerning what newly required information Wyeth had or should have 
had about the risks of IV-push administration of Phenergan . . . .”). Furthermore, Wyeth has the 
“burden in establishing a pre-emption defense” Id. at 1196. 
 248. Wyeth makes clear that “[i]mpossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense” and “the 
mere fact that the FDA approved [the drug’s] label does not establish” impossibility 
preemption. Id. at 1199. It provides far less constructive guidance on what would suffice. At 
times, the Court seems to suggest nothing short of an explicit rejection by the FDA of a 
proposed warning would do. See id. at 1198 (“[A]bsent clear evidence that the FDA would not 
have approved a change to Phenergan’s label, we will not conclude that it was impossible for 
Wyeth to comply with both federal and state requirements.”); id. at 1203 n.14 (“[T]he FDA did 
not consider and reject a stronger warning against IV-push injection of Phenergan”). But, in 
other places, the Court proposes a lesser burden of coming forward with relevant information 
regarding the risks. See id. at 1199 (“Wyeth does not argue that it supplied the FDA with an 
evaluation or analysis concerning the specific dangers posed by the IV-push method.”). 
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Turning from the agency’s regulatory record to its interpretive 
sphere, the Court by no means suggests that the agency’s view is 
irrelevant. To the contrary, the majority not only concedes that “some 
state-law claims might well frustrate the achievement of congressional 
objectives,” but also embraces Geier, as a case in which (as the dissent 
points out, with more than a twinge of irony): 
[n]otwithstanding the [National Traffic and Motor Safety Vehicle 
Act’s] saving clause, and notwithstanding the fact that Congress 
gave the Secretary authority to set only ‘minimum’ safety standards, 
we held Geier’s state tort suit pre-empted. In reaching that result, 
we relied heavily on the view of the Secretary of 
Transportation . . . expressed in an amicus brief . . . .249 
The majority’s embrace is more tepid,250 but the point remains 
that the Court is willing to accord Skidmore, or “power to persuade” 
 
  Defining a necessary and sufficient agency record to establish impossibility preemption 
will dominate the next wave of litigation. In Colacicco, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
preempted state-law failure to warn claims against the manufacturer of selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors, or SSRI, drugs, finding that “a state-law obligation to include a warning 
asserting the existence of an association between SSRIs and suicidality directly conflicts with the 
FDA’s oft-repeated conclusion that the evidence did not support such an association.” 
Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 271 (3d Cir. 2008). The court accorded the FDA’s 
position Skidmore deference, finding it persuasive on account of the consistency, care, formality, 
and relative expertise of the agency. Id. at 275. The United States argued before the Third 
Circuit that it is not the preamble that preempts plaintiffs’ claims, but rather the FDA’s 
repeated findings that there was insufficient scientific evidence of an association between adult 
use of antidepressants and suicidality to permit a warning on the labeling for those drugs. Brief 
of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 28–29, 
Colacicco, 521 F.3d 253 (No. 08-437), 2006 WL 5691532. 
  The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded Colacicco in light of Wyeth. Colacicco 
v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009) (mem.). The Third Circuit then remanded the 
consolidated cases back to their respective district courts. The U.S. has since rescinded its 
amicus brief in support of defendants-appellees, stating that “[t]he [FDA] has not yet conducted 
the sort of reexamination of various preemption issues following the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Wyeth that would be necessary to inform a position of the United States in this case.” Letter 
from Sharon Swingle, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Div., Appellate Staff, to Marcia M. Waldron, 
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Apr. 28, 2009). Consistent with my 
argument here, the FDA’s regulatory record with respect to SSRI drugs should be front and 
center. For a review of the FDA regulatory record with respect to SSRI drugs—including 
findings from internal scientific reviews and several advisory committees convened to study the 
matter as well as denials of numerous citizen petitions seeking review, see Richard A. Nagareda, 
FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 27–30 (2006). 
 249. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1221 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 250. Id. at 1201 (majority opinion) (“In prior cases, we have given ‘some weight’ to an 
agency’s views about the impact of tort law on federal objectives when ‘the subject matter is 
technica[l] and the relevant history and background are complex and extensive.’” (quoting 
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000))). 
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deference, to the position espoused by the agency.251 The FDA’s 
preemption preamble miserably fails this standard—the Court was 
unpersuaded by what the agency “said” when it seemed contrary to 
what it “did.” Put differently, deficits in the agency regulatory record 
cannot be overcome by embellishment by the agency in the 
interpretive sphere.252 
a. Agency Record.  Building upon the agency reference model, 
here I give a concrete example of precisely how a court might 
scrutinize the agency record in making its preemption determination. 
Recall the FDA’s 2008 CBE (changes being effected) drug regulation 
that governs when manufacturers can unilaterally change their labels 
in response to new risk evidence.253 During the notice-and-comment 
period, members of Congress (including Senator Edward Kennedy) 
challenged the proposed CBE rule on empirical grounds. The group 
requested data on the number of CBE supplements submitted to the 
FDA since 1982, as well as examples of any cases where a CBE 
supplement was used to the detriment of the public health.254 In a 
similar vein, the Consumers Union charged that the FDA had 
presented no evidence that overwarning presents a problem to public 
health.255 
The FDA responded in writing to Senator Kennedy and his 
colleagues. Its response, however, hardly instills confidence in its 
claims regarding the impending dangers of overwarning: of more than 
3000 CBEs,256 the FDA noted four relevant examples in which the 
 
 251. Id. (“The weight we accord the agency’s explanation of state law’s impact on the 
federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness.” (comparing 
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001) and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944))). 
 252. Id. at 1203 (“[T]he ‘complex and extensive’ regulatory history and background relevant 
to this case undercut the FDA’s recent pronouncements of pre-emption, as they reveal the 
longstanding co-existence of state and federal law and the FDA’s traditional recognition of 
state-law remedies—a recognition in place each time the agency reviewed Wyeth’s Phenergan 
label.” (citation omitted)). 
 253. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 314, 601, 814); see also supra Part I.A.2. 
 254. Waxman Letter, supra note 30, at 4. 
 255. Letter from Consumers Union to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA 6 (Mar. 17, 2008), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail& 
o=09000064803fb60f. 
 256. The FDA reports 2711, 550, and 789 CBEs for drugs, biologics, and medical devices, 
respectively. Letter from Stephen R. Mason, Acting Assistant Comm’r for Legislation, FDA to 
Hon. Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, U.S. 
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FDA rejected manufacturers’ CBE supplemental applications—none 
of which offered evidence of threatened harm to the public.257 Under 
my proposed model, the empirical backing for the FDA’s position 
would be scrutinized by a court, and, in turn, the FDA’s position 
would likely fail under hard look review. 
Consider, too, drug manufacturer Johnson & Johnson’s request 
that the agency “reaffirm its practice to provide a full and complete 
written response to all CBE supplements . . . [t]o enhance 
transparency and accountability in the safety labeling process.”258 
Johnson & Johnson urged the FDA to “provide a comprehensive, 
written response to the sponsor describing FDA’s grounds for 
approval, disapproval, or request for modifications to the CBE 
supplement.”259 The FDA declined to do so, and issued a quick 
dismissal without elaboration.260 
The framework I have proposed would, in fact, require the FDA 
to provide such comprehensive, written responses that would become 
part of the official agency record reviewable by courts making 
preemption determinations.261 To preserve their ability to mount a 
preemption defense, drug manufacturers, and other interested 
parties, should be able to challenge such refusals by the agency to 
create the necessary agency record. 
 
Senate 2–3 (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer? 
objectId=09000064804019ec&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. 
 257. See id. at 4. A 2008 report by Representative Waxman, moreover, suggests that FDA 
career officials raised this same objection internally. MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON 
OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., FDA CAREER STAFF OBJECTED TO AGENCY 
PREEMPTION POLICIES 14 (2008) [hereinafter MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON PREEMPTION], 
available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081029102934.pdf (“The rule is not, as it 
purports to be, consistent with the agency’s role in protecting the public health. We have not 
experienced problems with sponsors’ use of CBE supplements to over warn, and this rule tips 
the balance against early warnings by using vague and confusing terms such as ‘causal 
association’ and ‘reasonable time’ that will be difficult for staff and sponsors to apply.” (quoting 
Email from Jane Axelrad to Dr. John Jenkins et al. (June 17, 2008))). 
 258. Letter from Kathy Schroeher, Assoc. General Counsel, Johnson & Johnson, to Div. of 
Dockets Mgmt., FDA, at 1 (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ 
ContentViewer?objectId=09000064803fbc40&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. 
 259. Id. at 4. 
 260. Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, 
Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,607 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, 814) (“FDA disagrees with this comment [from Johnson & Johnson]. The 
comment failed to provide a compelling justification for this proposal.”). 
 261. See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 6, at 491–502; Sharkey, What 
Riegel Portends, supra note 121, at 446–50. 
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b. Change of Agency Position.  The judicial review component of 
the agency reference model is useful for another reason: it will cabin 
political forces and stave off the prospect of agency political flip-
flop.262 Lurking just beneath the surface of the Wyeth majority opinion 
is deep suspicion that the FDA changed its position on preemption 
for political as opposed to scientific or risk management reasons.263 
Scholars have argued that the perception of the politicization of 
federal agencies has decreased the level of deference that an agency 
receives from courts.264 Prior to Wyeth, lower courts cited the FDA’s 
inconsistency as reason to grant the agency’s position lesser 
deference.265 But Wyeth put the last nail in the coffin. Defendant 
manufacturer Wyeth’s implied obstacle preemption argument was, 
 
 262. Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule have called “expertise-forcing” the attempt by 
courts to ensure that agencies exercise expert judgment free from outside political pressures 
from the White House or political appointees in agencies. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 
242, at 52 (“[T]he Court majority[] increasing[ly] worries about the politicization of 
administrative expertise . . . .”); see also David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming 
Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1148 
(2008) (arguing that judicial review should be “expertise forcing” to “preclude federal agencies 
from preempting state and local regulators without first demonstrating to the courts that such 
preemption decisions are not themselves strongly influenced by political considerations.”). 
 263. See MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON PREEMPTION, supra note 257, at 14–15 (noting that 
officials in the White House and political appointees in the FDA threatened to block the 
Physician Labeling Rule unless the preemption changes were included); AM. ASS’N FOR 
JUSTICE, GET OUT OF JAIL FREE: HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION HELPS CORPORATIONS 
ESCAPE ACCOUNTABILITY 7–15 (2008), available at http://www.justice.org/resources/ 
Preemption_Rpt.pdf (summarizing findings from Freedom of Information Act requests that 
allegedly show a concerted effort during the Bush II administration, in part organized by the 
Office of Management and Budget, to preempt state laws through agency action without 
consultation with the states); see also James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second 
Century: Judicial Review, Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 
939, 969 (2008) (“The FDA’s [preemption preamble] was the culmination of the Bush 
Administration’s lobbying effort.”); David C. Vladeck, The FDA and Deference Lost: A Self-
Inflicted Wound or the Product of a Wounded Agency? A Response to Professor O’Reilly, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 991 (2008) (“[T]he Agency effected its dramatic change in position on 
preemption for political reasons, as opposed to scientific or public policy concerns.”). 
 264. See O’Reilly, supra note 263. In a different context, Freeman and Vermeule have 
situated Massachusetts v. EPA as “part of a trend in which the Court has at least temporarily 
become disenchanted with executive power and the idea of political accountability, and is now 
concerned to protect administrative expertise from political intrusion.” Freeman & Vermeule, 
supra note 242, at 54. 
 265. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Jackson v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 & n.3 (D. Neb. 2006); see also McNellis ex rel. DeAngelis v. 
Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286 (JBS), 2006 WL 2819046, at *9 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006) (finding that 
the FDA preamble constitutes an “unexplained change in position”), rev’d sub nom. Colacicco 
v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 129 S. Ct. 1578 
(2009) (mem.). 
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according to the majority, “[l]argely based on the FDA’s new 
position”266—built upon the edifice of the agency’s 2006 preemption 
preamble, which represented “a dramatic change in position.”267 The 
majority did not mince words in expressing its disdain for the FDA’s 
“newfound opinion,”268 finding it “entitled to no weight.”269 
This is not to say that agencies should never change their mind or 
switch their positions. Nor is it realistic to think that such decisions 
can (or should) be altogether divorced from politics. In fact, agencies, 
as arms of the executive branch, are supposed to reflect the political 
aims and policies of the President. What courts must scrutinize, 
instead, is ideologically-driven changes in position—especially those 
that are at odds with the nature and content of the agency regulatory 
record, and the scientific or other data of which that record is 
comprised.270 In this respect, the Wyeth majority gets to the heart of 
the issue when it complains that the FDA’s preemption preamble 
“reverses the FDA’s own longstanding position without providing a 
reasoned explanation, including any discussion of how state law has 
interfered with the FDA’s regulation of drug labeling during decades 
of coexistence.”271 Skidmore deference provides courts with an 
appropriate tool to scrutinize the “reasoned explanations” provided 
by agencies. 
CONCLUSION 
A surge in federal agency regulatory preemption coupled with 
some egregious examples of agency disregard of state regulatory 
interests during the Bush II administration has shaped the debate on 
 
 266. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1203 (2009) (emphasis added). 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 1204. 
 270. The majority opinion calls the U.S. amicus brief “undeserving of deference” given that 
“[t]he Government’s explanation of federal drug regulation departs markedly from the FDA’s 
understanding at all times relevant to this case.” Id. at 1203 n.13. 
 271. Id. at 1201 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1202 ( “[T]he FDA traditionally regarded 
state law as a complementary form of drug regulation.”). There is evidence of a prior 
antipreemption position: in 1998, the FDA stated that it was “establishing ‘minimal standards’ 
for drug labels [and] did not intend ‘to preclude the states from imposing additional labeling 
requirements.’” Id. at 1202 & n. 10 (quoting 63 Fed. Reg. at 66,384) (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 37,437 
(1979); 59 Fed. Reg. 3948 (1994)). 
  The dissent, by contrast, interprets the FDA’s change in position as a natural and 
expected shift away from a “decade-old and now-repudiated” statement. Id. at 1229 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
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the proper institutional role for federal agencies in determining the 
boundaries of federal law and the outcome of clashes with state law. 
One might conclude that the skepticism (bordering on hostility) with 
which judges and scholars assail agency input on these key federalism 
matters is ephemeral—shifts in the political winds leading to 
oscillation by agencies in the extent to which they assert federal 
power. 
That said, it is worth considering whether a power shift has, in 
fact, taken place—a shift that will be seen to transcend a switch in 
political administrations.272 My own view is that Congress has ceded 
significant ground to federal agencies. Changes in administration 
might, nonetheless, create more or less amenable climates for 
reforming the agency decisionmaking process along the lines that I 
have suggested. 
In this Article I advance two basic normative claims—albeit 
against a backdrop that seems to be in considerable tension with 
achieving them. First, agency disregard of states’ interests is by no 
means inevitable. Second, and more fundamentally, Congress, the 
executive, and, most significantly, the courts can ensure that these 
state regulatory interests are no longer ignored, by implementing 
agency-forcing measures that will steer agencies toward a more 
responsive, and responsible, course. 
 
 272. Cf. Kagan, supra note 117, at 2248 (demonstrating the continuation of an expanded 
federal power from the Reagan and Bush years into the Clinton administration, albeit for 
different political ends). 
